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Involuntary Cotenants: Eminent Domain and Energy
and Communications Infrastructure Growth
Andrew P. Morriss*
Roy Brandys**
Michael M. Barron***
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state governments’ push for renewable electricity
generation, rapidly expanding domestic natural gas and
unconventional oil production, and the need to strengthen the United
States’ energy and telecommunications infrastructure against both
natural disasters and terrorist attacks mean that national networks of
transmission lines, pipelines, and telecommunications lines will
expand considerably over the next few decades. Much of the growth
is likely to involve the use of eminent domain because utilities and
governments often consider eminent domain to be a cheaper and
easier alternative to negotiating with potentially resistant, unhappy
landowners for the acquisition of property. Unfortunately, state
eminent domain laws are inadequate for coping with this growth in
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infrastructure, protecting landowners’ rights in the face of expanding
utility easements, or giving utilities inappropriate price signals.
Much attention in recent years has focused on the abuse of
eminent domain by governments to benefit private interests by
taking property rights under the guise of promoting economic
development or addressing “blight,” particularly in the aftermath of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.1 We
argue that there is an equally important set of problems caused by
inadequacies in state eminent domain laws. Specifically, the taking
of easements for power lines, pipelines, and communications lines—
“large infrastructure easements” (LIEs)—essentially creates an
involuntary cotenancy between the landowner (the owner of the
servient estate) and the utility (the owner of the LIE) because of the
increased burdens the easements place on servient estates relative to
more traditional easements for rights of way or utility distribution
lines.2 To a much greater extent than the property interests taken for
roads, neighborhood distribution lines, or other more traditional
takings, LIEs create an ongoing relationship between the easement
holder and the landowner that is far more demanding than the
relationship created when a fee estate is condemned. In these
instances, “the devil is in the details” of the easement—and the
easement is written exclusively by the utility taking the LIE without
the participation of the landowner or review by a court or other
neutral third party. Infrastructure easements generally pose serious
governance problems. Public entities have serious incentive
problems in maintaining often-hidden, capital-intensive projects,
making “the problem of neglect . . . pervasive.”3 The grant of
eminent domain power to utilities was itself a sign of the political
power of a powerful interest group.4 Basing the only check on the
exercise of that power on price is problematic for a number of

1. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical
Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009); Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs
of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 623 (2006).
2. “Infrastructure” is “the structural assets of the built environment and its
physical support networks” and is characterized by “capital intensity, high
public investment by all levels of government, and criticality to the economy.”
NEIL S. GRIGG, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: THE BUSINESS OF INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 5, 7 (2010).
3. Id. at 10.
4. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 27 (1999).
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reasons. This is particularly so today as utilities were given that
power at a time when they were much more heavily regulated.5
The absence of many of the protections the law uses to cope
with the inevitable conflicts between those who share interests in
the same property in LIEs created through eminent domain creates
problems. For example, where multiple owners have voluntarily
shared property ownership in a fee estate through one of the
traditional forms of joint ownership—tenancy in common, joint
tenancy with right of survivorship, or tenancy by the entirety—
property law generally fences off many of their dealings and leaves
these issues to the co-owners to resolve through ex ante
negotiations or to work out ex post. However, property law
provides a crucial unilateral exit mechanism for these co-owners in
the form of partition, which enables any owner to escape a
relationship that has become dysfunctional, and to use the courts to
equitably divide the property or the proceeds of a sale of the
property. The shadow of these exit rights plays a key role in
structuring the co-owners’ relationship.6 This enables Coasian
bargaining in the creation and modification of easements. Since
there are neither exit rights for landowners whose property is
subject to a LIE nor well-developed legal principles for coping
with conflicts between the LIE holder and the landowner, there is a
problematic gap in the law that requires court intervention where a
LIE is poorly defined ex ante.7
5. Id. at 27 (indicating that the “monopoly was only the most obvious
benefit of regulation. Utilities also earned other special privileges, such as the
right of eminent domain.”).
6. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970) (noting that “the
exit option is widely held to be uniquely powerful: by inflicting revenue losses
on delinquent management, exit is expected to induce that ‘wonderful
concentration of the mind’ akin to the one Samuel Johnson attributed to the
prospect of being hanged.”).
7. Not surprisingly, many appellate opinions concerning disputes over
easements end with a remand to the trial court for further proceedings to flesh
out the exact parameters of the easement once the appellate court has settled the
relevant legal principles governing the relationship. See, e.g., Graves v. Gerber,
302 N.W.2d 717 (Neb. 1981). Graves concerned two neighbors with abutting
driveways. Graves’s house included an exterior step extending into his
driveway, which required vehicles to veer for a short distance onto Gerber’s
driveway while passing the step in order to reach Graves’s garage. The parties’
predecessors in interest had created an easement permitting this, which stated, “a
right of way over that portion of their property to the party of the second part,
for said purposes of moving vehicles to and from the garage on the property of
the party of the second part.” Id. at 719. Graves and Gerber’s relationship
deteriorated – including disputes over whether Graves shoveled snow onto
Gerber’s driveway in clearing the easement, parking by one on the property of
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Landowners, whose property is taken by a utility for a LIE, are
at a significant disadvantage under eminent domain law with
respect to structuring their relationship compared to the other
categories of landowners who are compelled to provide easements
to others involuntarily. In some circumstances, courts can create
easements by implication or necessity.8 When courts create such
easements, they have broad equitable powers to shape the terms of
the easement to minimize the harms to the burdened landowner
while addressing the needs of the easement owner. The court
proceeding serves as a substitute for the bargaining process, with a
neutral decision-maker making the final determination of the terms
of the easement.
Because easements generally pose long-term governance
problems for the dominant and servient interest owners, when an
easement is created in a voluntary transaction, the parties have
incentives to address those problems and the means to do so. The
incentive stems from the easement’s impact on the value of the
properties involved. A well-crafted easement will increase the net
value of the combined properties more than a poorly crafted one.
The negotiations between the parties over the terms provide one
means to ensure easements are well crafted; the law governing
easements provides another. Because there are generally no
negotiations over the creation of a LIE through eminent domain
other than over price, getting the background legal principles right
is particularly important in coping with LIEs. Unfortunately, both
eminent domain law and easement law fall short in this regard.
the other, noise from air conditioning units, and other matters – and Gerber
erected a fence along the property line which prevented this and required Graves
to have difficulties in getting to his driveway. Id. at 720. The appeals court held
that
The easement must be limited to the use as established in practice.
Graves’ vehicles must enter on his own driveway and remain there until
it is necessary to drive onto the Gerber drive to safely pass the
obstructions. The vehicles must then return to the Graves drive. This
same path should also be followed in making exit to the street. The
owners of the dominant tenement in removing snow from their own
drive and from the portion of the drive subject to the easement shall
pile none of it on the servient tenement. The servient tenement shall not
be used for the parking of vehicles by the owners of the dominant
tenement or their visitors.
Id. at 720–21. It also remanded the case for the trial court to “view the premises
to determine whether the removal of the fence south of the gap is required by the
established use.” Id. at 721.
8. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§34.07–34.10 (Michael Allen Wolf, ed.,
2013); See 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY §330, 95 (1980).
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The existing academic literature on expanding LIEs is almost
entirely written by proponents of renewable energy whose main
concern is making eminent domain use easier rather than the fair
treatment of landowners.9 There has thus been almost no attention
paid to the day-to-day governance problems created by forcibly
imposing LIEs on tens of thousands of landowners across the
United States.
Currently, state eminent domain laws give sole discretion to the
utility in drafting the easement. Accordingly, neither negotiation
nor exit is available to landowners when a utility invokes eminent
domain to take a LIE. Not only are landowners unable to structure
the relationship with the safeguards servient estate owners might
include in an easement created through negotiation (because
landowners faced with eminent domain proceedings have little
bargaining power and the utility can generally be compelled to
adjust only the price term), but the landowners are also denied the
safeguard of judicial crafting of the easement terms applicable in
cases of other compulsory easements. Not surprisingly, the
landowner is typically not only in an involuntary relationship with
the utility, but is often in an openly adversarial one. Further,
landowners are generally at a significant bargaining disadvantage,
as utilities are large firms with considerable political clout.10
9. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C.L.
REV. 1079, 1086 (2013) (“eminent domain authority for transmission lines has
always been, and will likely remain, a key legal tool to facilitate the
development of such lines”). In addition, several commentators have argued that
states build too few transmission lines because they undervalue the national
benefits of the lines. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1803–04 (2012) (“in light of the current regulatory regime,
which consists of small, highly devolved decisionmaking infrastructures, there
are significant obstacles associated with creating large-scale systems that span
many jurisdictions. Some of these challenges include (1) transmission siting and
permitting structures that exist primarily at the state level; (2) lack of robust
federal authority or regional coordinating authority to plan and site transmission
infrastructure when states fail to approve projects as a result of citizen
opposition, politics, or cost; and (3) difficulty in determining which electricity
users should pay for new transmission lines, particularly where those lines need
to be built in states with significant wind resources, small populations, and low
electricity demand.”); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power
Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1048 (2009) (“State
transmission siting statutes do not provide an adequate legal mechanism to
ensure the consideration of regional benefits and, to the extent in-state benefits
predominate as the driving factor for siting decisions, will stand as a significant
barrier to planning and constructing new high-voltage transmission facilities to
transport power from renewable sources.”).
10. RICHARD MUNSON, FROM EDISON TO ENRON: THE BUSINESS OF POWER
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY 3 (2005) (noting that
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“Giant utilities employ some of the most effective lobbyists,
working on many fronts to maintain their monopolistic benefits,”
and spent over $21 million in federal campaign contributions in
2002.11 The result is that infrastructure projects create a set of
relationships between landowners and utilities that require repeated
interactions on a wide range of issues, but deny the landowners the
key tools the law provides in analogous situations that ensure the
bargains reached are welfare enhancing, rather than mere wealth
transfers from landowners to utilities that accompany the creation
of LIEs.
We argue that eminent domain laws need to be reformed to
address these problems. The simplest reform is to eliminate
eminent domain from LIEs entirely, forcing utilities to negotiate
easement terms in arm’s length transactions and leveling the
playing field between the utilities and landowners. Because the
burdened landowners are a dispersed and unorganized interest
group, while utilities have considerable political clout, this may be
unobtainable through the political process in many states.
Similarly, the even more potent “bootleggers and Baptists”
coalition of utilities and environmental pressure groups, which
back expansion of transmission lines for renewable energy, if not
natural gas or oil pipelines, mobilize powerful interests behind
maintaining the power. Therefore, we also suggest reforms that
ameliorate some of the more significant problems without
eliminating utilities’ use of eminent domain entirely. For example,
providing courts (and other third parties with roles in eminent
domain proceedings) with the opportunity to alter the easement
terms proposed by utilities for LIEs would serve as an important
step toward solving many of the problems we describe. In addition,
states and the federal government can take further steps to improve
the LIE acquisition process by gathering and disseminating market
data to, and providing greater statutory guidance for, valuation
decisions. Part I sets out the basics of the coming expansion of the
United States’ energy and telecommunications grids and the
resulting increase in the use of eminent domain. Part II compares
the property law framework utilized in other contexts for dealing
with easements and cotenants with how current eminent domain

electric utilities have assets of over $600 billion and annual sales over $260
billion and are the largest industry in the United States).
11. Id. at 4. The utility industry was involved in political corruption from its
start: “Early competition in the electricity industry . . . involved bribing aldermen
for the permits needed to string wires across or under city streets.” Id. at 22.
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law treats these problems. Part III proposes a series of legislative
solutions to remedy the problems identified.
I. THE GROWING PROBLEM OF LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE EASEMENTS
America’s energy and telecommunications infrastructure will
increase in coming decades. A critical part of this expansion will
be the acquisition of easements for electric transmission lines,
pipelines, and other infrastructure by electric, gas, and
telecommunications utilities. Note that LIEs can be distinguished
in several key ways from smaller-scale infrastructure easements
(SSIEs) such as electric distribution, telecommunications lines, or
gas pipelines from a central distribution point to individual homes
or businesses, the so-called “last mile” of the networks, which we
discuss below.
This expansion of LIEs will occur for several reasons. First,
federal and many state governments are promoting growth in
renewable electricity production, primarily from wind and solar
energy, through subsidies and mandates.12 The best locations for

12. See Lincoln L. Davies, Tracing U.S. Renewable Energy Policy, 43
ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10320, 10325–27 (2013) (describing federal
renewable policy as a “wide array of legal and regulatory measures, almost too
many to document” and noting that 37 states and the District of Columbia have
renewable portfolio standards requiring their utilities to include renewables, up
from one state in 1993); Sanya Carleyolsen, Tangled in the Wires: An
Assessment of the Existing U.S. Renewable Energy Legal Framework, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 759, 771–76 (2006). Some energy sector entrepreneurs argue for
less reliance on the grid. For example, Thomas Casten has argued in favor of
expanding the use of on-site generators as a means of increasing reliability and
competition.
On-site generators, according to Casten, offer enormous advantages.
First, they reduce the need for unpopular transmission lines. “Remove
the ban on private wires that bypass distribution monopolies and the
result will be fewer wires,” he says. “If industry met all future load
growth with on-site power, the U.S. would not need any new
transmission lines.”
MUNSON, supra note 10, at 136. Similarly, Schewe’s history of the grid notes
that increasing use of cogeneration and smaller plants is leading to some
reduction in long distance transport of electricity. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE
GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR ELECTRIFIED WORLD 198
(2007) (“Why not just build more lines? Because they’re expensive to construct,
politically painful to plan (‘Not in my backyard’), tricky to finance (in a volatile
business with huge price swings), and difficult to regulate (conflicting state and
federal statutes).”). Because distribution lines lose 10-20% of the power
transmitted over them, a large scale grid requires more generation capacity than
a smaller scale one. Resolving such issues is beyond the scope of our paper, but
the issue highlights the interdependence of energy policy decisions and suggests
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generating such power are often far from centers of electricity
consumption.13 In addition, technical considerations often require
network expansion to effectively add new power sources to
existing grid infrastructure, including many miles of new high
voltage lines.14 The existing transmission infrastructure “is a
rickety antique . . . . Today’s high-voltage transmission lines were
designed before planners ever imagined that enormous amounts of
electricity would be sold across state lines, and, consequently, the
wires are often overloaded and subject to blackouts.”15 Reliability

that the scale of LIEs necessary will depend in part on how other issues are
resolved. Id.
13. Vaughn Nelson, Wind Power, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION,
TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION I-1, 1-1 (Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed.
2012) (“In general, windy areas are distant from load centers, which means that
transmission is a problem for large-scale installation of wind farms.”); Ken
Zweibel, et al., Solar Grand Plan, 298 SCI. AMER. 1, 1 (2007) (“To convert the
country to solar power, huge tracts of land would have to be covered with
photovoltaic panels and solar heating troughs. A direct-current (DC)
transmission backbone would also have to be erected to send that energy
efficiently across the nation.”); Math H.J. Bollen & Fainan Hassan,
INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN THE POWER SYSTEM 86–87
(2011) (noting tendency of new power sources to be located away from
consuming areas). The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) also
added to this trend by authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to mandate interconnection of independent power producers to the grid.
Hirsch describes how utilities failed to anticipate FERC’s aggressive use of this
authority. HIRSH, supra note 4, at 89–117. The 1992 Energy Policy Act
furthered this trend. Id. at 243–44.
14. See Matthew Slavin & Jason J. Zeller, No Grid, No Gain: Untangling the
Transmission Tie-Up, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Apr. 15, 2011) http://www
.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/04/no-grid-no-gain-untanglingthe-transmission-tie-up, archived at http://perma.cc/KQ9Z-B34Q (“[O]ne primary
hurdle facing renewable developers stems from limitations to the existing
transmission grid. Simply put, efforts to integrate renewable generation into the
U.S. energy mix have frequently been stymied by the lack of available
transmission facilities.”); MUNSON, supra note 10, at 138 (“Most utilities” respond
to reliability problems “by trying to construct more centralized power plants, more
transmission and distribution lines, and perhaps banks of batteries.”). High voltage
transmission lines are more efficient than low voltage lines because increasing the
voltage allows reductions in the current for the same amount of power (as Power =
Voltage x Current) and because transport losses are a function of the square of
current. STEVEN W. BLUME, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM BASICS FOR THE
NONELECTRICAL PROFESSIONAL 48–49 (2007).
15. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 4. See also DAVID E. NYE, WHEN THE
LIGHTS WENT OUT: A HISTORY OF BLACKOUTS IN AMERICA 31 (2010) (“In 1960
it [the grid] was the most advanced machine of its kind, and half of its
components were less than 10 years old. But by 2005 the grid was a patchwork
of old and new elements that badly needed an overhaul.”); F. MICHAEL
MALOOF, A NATION FORESAKEN: EMP: THE ESCALATING THREAT OF AN
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becomes increasingly important as the network expands because
failures affect more people.16 Efforts to boost competition amongst
utilities can also lead to increased demand for LIEs.17 For example,
the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the use of
eminent domain for “national interest electric transmission
corridors.”18
Second, market forces are also driving changes to energy
infrastructure. Fracking has unleashed a natural gas revolution.19

AMERICAN CATASTROPHE 25 (2013) (“[T]he grid is effectively maxed . . . It is
far less able to compensate for any potential difficulties than in the past.”);
SCHEWE, supra note 12, at 244 (“One of the most urgent problems is crowdedness
in long-distance interstate power transmission. Everyone recognizes that there
isn’t enough superhighway to send all the power that needs sending, at least not
enough if you want to have some standby emergency-carrying ability…”); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE
OF FUTURE ELEC. TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. TO TERRORIST
ATTACK, TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 30 (2013)
[hereinafter NRC, TERRORISM] (“The transmission system is much more stressed,
and thus more vulnerable than it was a few decades ago.”). Technological change
may also reduce the need for an expanded grid by increasing the capacity of the
existing transmission network.
16. NYE, supra note 15, at 27 (“As electricity wove networks together,
power failures became less and less tolerable, because they shut down the entire
infrastructure.”).
17. Id. at 156 (citing a utility executive for the proposition that “insufficient
transmission [capacity] had protected local power markets, inhibited
competition, restricted customer choice, and threatened the reliability of the
system.”); Id. at 158 (explaining lack of investment in transmission capacity
leading up to deregulation of electric utilities).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 824 (2005). See also Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M.
Jolivert, DOE Transmission Corridor Designations & FERC Backstop Siting
Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the
Development of New Transmission Facilities? 30 ENERGY L. J. 415, 452–54
(2009) (describing process).
19. ROBERT W. KOLB, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION: AT THE PIVOT OF
THE WORLD’S ENERGY FUTURE 64 (2014) (noting that after declining and static
natural gas reserves from 1970 to 2000, reserves have grown by 90% in a
decade). Pipeline construction was “the key step” in making use of natural gas
during the twentieth century. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY,
ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 64 (1974).
Deregulation of natural gas sales played an important role in launching this
revolution. Under the pre-deregulation regime, “Wellhead price controls
discouraged exploration and gradually cut down the gas reserves available for
interstate sale by pipelines to customers. As Stephen Breyer and Paul MacAvoy
pointed out, the failure to develop new reserves early in the 1960s was already
curtailing production by the end of the decade.” CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA &
CLARANCE M. SMITH, GAS PIPELINES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA’S
REGULATORY STATE: A HISTORY OF PANHANDLE EASTERN CORPORATION,
1928-1993 184 (1996). See also BREYER & MACAVOY, at 64 (“The [Federal
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Not only has this led to greater use of natural gas to generate
electricity and industrial uses, but expanding the network of natural
gas pipelines into areas with weak gas infrastructure (e.g., New
England) will allow industrial and residential users to shift off of
fuel oil.20 Just a few years ago, the United States worried that it
was running out of natural gas.21 In response, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) terminals were built to allow the import of natural gas.22
Some of these terminals are now being converted to export
facilities, and new export facilities are also being planned.23
Moreover, cheap natural gas is encouraging the conversion of fleet
vehicles to burn LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG).24 In
addition, states such as California offer incentives to individuals to
use CNG personal vehicles.25 These trends will require increasing

Power C]ommission’s start-up effort, from the 1940s to the 1960s, centered on
constraining transport prices for service and thus profits of the pipeline
companies.”).
20. See, e.g., Tux Turkel, Maine Poised for Historic Transition to Natural Gas,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013
/05/25/maine-poised-for-historic-transition-to-natural-gas-2013-05-26/, archived at
http://perma.cc/6A9K-QWAF?type=image; Lori Valigra, Will Natural Gas Alleviate
Maine’s Energy Woes?, M AINE ’ S B US . N EWS S OURCE , (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20130902/CURRENTEDITION/308299998/willnatural-gas-alleviate-maine’s-energy-woes, archived at http://perma.cc/FT4L-5Z4V;
John Kemp, Connecticut Contemplates Connecting More to Gas: Kemp, REUTERS,
(Oct. 19, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-columnkemp-connecticut-gas-idUSBRE89I0PT20121019, archived at http://perma.cc
/DLH9-W93K; Oil-fired boiler users converting to natural gas, PLANT
ENGINEERING (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.plantengineering.com/single-article/oilfired-boiler-users-converting-to-natural-gas/82e47ea9b74df17d60328adee24b241b
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B2XN-2578; Jason Notte, Demand Grows in N.E.
for Natural Gas Heat, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2012, at B7; SCHEWE, supra note
12, at 194–95 (describing growth in demand for natural gas for electric generation).
21. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Why U.S. Is Running Out
of Gas, TIME (July 13, 2003), http://content.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,464406,00.html (quoting Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan
that “We are not apt to return to earlier periods of relative abundance and low
prices [for natural gas] anytime soon.”).
22. KOLB, supra note 19, at 79; MICHAEL D. TUSIANI & GORDON SHEARER,
LNG: A NONTECHNICAL GUIDE 33–36 (2007).
23. KOLB, supra note 19, at 88–89. The complete absence of discussion of
U.S. exports in Tusiani and Shearer’s 2007 guide is a testament to the rapidity of
the change caused by the fracking revolution.
24. Id. at 91.
25. See Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
http://www.driveclean.ca.gov/Search_and_Explore/Technologies_and_Fuel_Type
s/Compressed_Natural_Gas.php, archived at http://perma.cc/PGP-8UBR (last
visited Sept. 30, 2014) (“There are typically some very enticing incentives for
these vehicles. For instance, they are still eligible for HOV stickers.”).
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pipeline capacity to ensure that sufficient supplies are available at a
network of refueling stations.26
Further, the discovery of vast quantities of unconventional oil
reserves in remote areas has created a need for expansion of the
crude oil and refined product pipeline networks.27 The Keystone
XL pipeline is a dramatic example of this demand for pipeline
expansion, but many more miles of other pipelines will be needed
to bring these reserves to refineries.28 The demand for expansion of
26. See Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage Infrastructure Projections
Through 2030, ICF INT’L 3 (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id
=10509, archived at http://perma.cc/XA6B-G8HG (predicting need for 28,900 to
61,900 miles of natural gas pipeline by 2030 in U.S. and Canada); Rodney
White, CNG Startups target end-users far from pipelines, NG ADVANTAGE
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ngadvantage.com/news/in-the-news/cng-startupstarget-end-users-far-pipelines, archived at http://perma.cc/MSB7-V2GB
(describing challenges of delivering natural gas to customers not connected to
pipelines). The growth of natural gas is also causing expanded investment in
fueling facilities for the trucking market. Peter Kelly-Detwiler, Acceleration of
the Natural Gas Highway, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2012/11/13/acceleration-of-the-natural-gashighway/, archived at http://perma.cc/F5TH-4RTS; Jim Polson, GE, Chesapeake
to Develop Natural Gas Infrastructure, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-07/ge-chesapeake-to-developnatural-gas-car-fueling-service-in-u-s-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G6ZD9Z3; Rebecca Smith, Natural Gas Filling Stations: Few and Far Between,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2012, at B2; Michelle Jarboe McFee, TravelCenters firms
up Shell deal for natural gas fueling stops across the United States, PLAIN
DEALER (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business
/index.ssf/2013/04/travelcenters_firms_up_shell_d.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/G7YH-27T9. The development of a national network of natural gas
pipelines is a comparatively recent development. As recently as 1930, there was
only a fragmentary pipeline network, with most gas needs met via synthetic gas
plants that converted coal into coal gas. CASTENADA & SMITH, supra note 19, at
19. By 1934, the network had expanded dramatically so that almost 40% of gas
crossed state lines in pipelines. Id. at 71.
27. See Kristen Hays, Oil Pipeline Crunch Shifts U.S. Shale Race from
Drillbits to Valves, REUTERS (July 30, 2012, 4:44 AM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2012/07/30/us-oil-usa-pipelines-idUSBRE86T02820120730,
archived at http://perma.cc/KD6Z-UFHC; Patrick McGeever, Crude Oil Pipeline
Build Out More Than Just Keystone XL, AAM THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (2012),
http://www.aamcompany.com/wp-content/uploads/AAM-Thought-LeadershipCrude-Oil-Build-Out-More-Than-Just-Keystone-XL-11.28.12.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZE5J-YFCY.
28. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Pipelines are Safest for Transportation of Oil
and Gas, Manhattan Institute Issue Brief No. 23 (June 2013), (noting that
“[r]ising oil and natural gas production is outpacing the transportation capacity
of our inadequate national pipeline infrastructure.”). The existing network of
long distance pipelines dates only to the 1930s and really expanded during
World War II. JOHN L. KENNEDY, OIL AND GAS PIPELINE FUNDAMENTALS 3
(1984).
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the pipeline network is also driven by concerns that the current
system of rail and truck transportation is both more dangerous and
more costly than pipelines.29
Similarly, demand for communications bandwidth continues to
grow, requiring continuing expansion of the telecommunications
network. Forecasts of Internet traffic now refer to the “zettabyte
era,” with a zettabyte being one billion terabytes.30 The market for
fiber optic cables and connectors is forecast to grow by 50%
annually until 2017, although technological advances are also
increasing existing networks’ capacity.31
Third, existing energy and telecommunications networks are
fragile and require infrastructure investment to protect them
against a variety of threats.32 The August 14, 2003 blackout in the
29. Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 28 (indicating that “pipeline transportation
is safer than transportation by road, rail, or barge, as measured by incidents,
injuries, and fatalities—even though more road and rail incidents go
unreported.”); Edward McAllister, Train Carrying Crude Oil Derails, Cars
Ablaze in Alabama, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013, 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2013/11/08/us-crude-train-explosion-idUSBRE9A70Q920131108,
archived at http://perma.cc/TA6C-EF2X (describing derailment of train carrying
N.D. oil to Alabama); Canadian Hamlet Evacuated after Oil Train Crash
Ca u s es Hu g e B la ze, T H E G U AR D I A N ( O c t. 1 9 2 0 1 3 , 1 2 :0 9 P M) ,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/19/canada-rail-fire-derailment,
archived at http://perma.cc/56WK-ECZA (describing derailment of train carrying
crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas from Edmonton to Vancouver); Quebec oil
train disaster: 24 bodies recovered so far, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013, 12:22
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/quebec-oil-train-crash-disas
ter-24-bodies, archived at http://perma.cc/8GDD-NETT (describing oil train
derailment that killed fifty).
30. The Zettabyte Era, CISCO (June 10, 2014), http://www.cisco.com
/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/VNI_Hyperconnect
ivity_WP.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3GC4-ZE6J (forecasting that “[i]n
2016, global IP traffic will reach 1.1 zettabytes per year or 91.3 exabytes per
month, and by 2018, global IP traffic will reach 1.6 zettabytes per year or 131.9
exabytes per month” while “IP traffic in North America will reach 40.5 exabytes
per month by 2018”).
31. Valerie C. Coffey, Forecast for Fiber Optics; Strong Growth through
2017, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.osa-opn.org
/home/industry/2013/august/forecasts_for_fiber_optics_strong_growth _through
_2/?feed=Industry#.VCtzeyldUh0, archived at http://perma.cc/3HGC-BZLG;
Anton Troianovski, Optical Delusion? Fiber Booms Again, Despite Bust, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 4, 2012, at A1.
32. See John G. Kappenman, Geomagnetic Disturbances and Impacts upon
Power System Operation, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION III-1, 17–1
(“Recent analysis carried out for the EMP Commission, Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences has determined that severe geomagnetic storms
(i.e., space weather caused by solar activity) has the potential to cause crippling
and long-duration damage to the North American electric power grid or any
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Northeast—caused by a constellation of problems occurring at the
same time—revealed significant weaknesses in the power grid.33
Since September 11, 2001, there has also been increased concern
over the vulnerability of the United States’ electrical and
telecommunications grid to terrorists.34
For such reasons, the coming decades are likely to see an
expansion of LIEs as utilities attempt to cope with the demands of
renewable energy sources, new sources of natural gas and

exposed power grid through the world. The primary impact to the power grid is
the risk of widespread permanent damage to high-voltage transformers and other
power delivery and production assets, which are key, scarce, and difficult to
replace, of the high-voltage power network.”); MALOOF, supra note 15, at 35
(“The entire petroleum and natural gas delivery system relies on SCADA
[supervisory control and data acquisition systems] and is thus susceptible to
dangerous malfunctions that could lead to massive fires and explosions as a
result of an EMP event.”). As Kappenman notes, the problem is severe because
the footprint of a space weather event can “extend across a continent.”
Kappenman, supra note 32, at 17–2. Our current national grid magnifies the
problem by serving as a potential “large antenna to these storms.” Id. at 17-3.
Since these events are “inherently instantaneous”, there is little time to react to
them when they occur. Id. In the March 13, 1989 Quebec blackout, the grid went
from normal operation to province-wide blackout in 92 seconds as the result of
seven near-simultaneous equipment failures. Id. As Kappenman explains, as our
power transmission network:
[H]as grown in size, it has also grown in complexity and sets in place a
compounding of risks that are posed to the power grid infrastructures
for GIC [geomagnetically induced current] events. Some of the more
important changes in technology base that can increase impacts from
GIC events include higher design voltages, changes in transformer
design, and other related apparatus. The operating levels of highvoltage networks have increased from the 100-200kV thresholds of the
1950s to 400-765kV levels of present-day networks. With this increase
in operating voltages, the average per unit length circuit resistance has
decreased while the average length of the grid circuit increases. In
addition, power grids are designed to be tightly inter-connected
networks, which present a complex circuit that is continental in size.
These interrelated design factors have acted to substantially increase
the levels of GIC that are possible in modern power networks.
Id. at 17-13.
33. Blackout 2003: How Did It Happen and Why? Hearing Before the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the H.R., 108th Cong. 1 (2010); NYE, supra
note 15, at 161 (attributing 2003 blackout to “an under-regulated utility system
relying on outmoded monitoring equipment and inadequate transmission lines to
meet rising demand.”); MUNSON, supra note 10, at 147 (“The traditional power
industry’s knee-jerk reaction to the 2003 blackout was: ‘Expand the grid.’”).
34. NRC, TERRORISM, supra note 15; GRIGG, supra note 2, at 307–08; NYE,
supra note 15, at 180–199; MALOOF, supra note 15, at 108 (noting that much of
the U.S. military’s domestic operations rely on civilian energy and
telecommunications grids).
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petroleum, increasing demand for telecommunications bandwidth,
and the need to protect existing networks against natural disasters
and terrorists. Utilities with the power of eminent domain are
likely to use the eminent domain power because eminent domain
provides them with significant advantages in terms of cost and
easement language.35
LIEs present unique problems for the legal system. They are
distinguishable from SSIEs in three important ways. First, SSIEs
provide benefits to the servient estate (e.g., electrical service,
phone and cable lines, natural gas service), while LIEs typically
provide no direct benefits to the servient estate.36 Second, SSIEs
generally require less intrusion onto the servient estate for
inspection and maintenance. For example, a typical utility
distribution line runs along a property border and is accessible
from the adjacent street or alley. Other than tree trimming in the
easement, utilities and property owners rarely have any interaction,
much less conflicts, in contrast to the industrial-sized use and
maintenance needs of LIEs. Third, SSIEs involve infrastructure on
35. These advantages are well-documented in the literature on the abuse of
eminent domain for economic development projects. See, e.g., Ilya Somin,
Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1021
(2004) (“[E]conomic development takings are especially vulnerable” to rentseeking.). Just as in the economic development context, eminent domain allows
utilities to acquire property rights at a lower cost than market transactions
would.
36. This appears to factor into courts’ analyses of disputes over SSIEs. In a
dispute over the addition of cable television lines to existing utility easements,
the Missouri Court of Appeals found for the cable company, finding that:
The unsurprising fact that the drafters of the 1922 easements did not
envision cable television does not mandate the narrow interpretation of
the purposes of the conveyance of rights and privileges urged by
plaintiffs. The expressed intention of the predecessors of plaintiff
trustees was to obtain for the homeowners in the subdivision the
benefits of electric power and telephonic communications. Scientific
and technological progress over the ensuing years have added an
unforeseen dimension to such contemplated benefits, the transmission
by electric impulse of visual and audio communication over coaxial
cable. It is an inescapable conclusion that the intention of plaintiffs’
predecessors was the acquisition and continued maintenance of
available means of bringing electrical power and communication into
the homes of the subdivision. Clearly, it is in the public interest to use
the facilities already installed for the purpose of carrying out this
intention to provide the most economically feasible and least
environmentally damaging vehicle for installing cable systems.
Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cnty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, the extension of utilities into existing neighborhoods
provided landowners with a “highly attractive and increasingly affordable”
service. SCHEWE, supra note 12, at 71.
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a much smaller scale, reducing the potential for conflict between
the servient estate holder and the utility.37 Finally, SSIEs are often
an integral part of the development of a tract and are welcomed by
landowners desiring the services the SSIE brings.
LIEs are, as the name suggests, large. The United States natural
gas pipeline network is 278,000 miles long;38 the oil trunk line
network is 55,000 miles long with another 95,000 miles of refined
product pipelines;39 the electrical transmission network has more
than 200,000 miles of high voltage lines,40 and the fiber optic cable
network is extensive and likely to grow.41 Their terms therefore
affect tens of thousands of landowners across the country, and a
single project requiring LIEs may stretch across multiple
jurisdictional boundaries. Further, LIEs are critical to the integrity
of our nation’s infrastructure. Modern society depends on reliable
telecommunications and energy delivery. The chaos that followed
the 2003 blackout in the Midwest and Northeast, which was
partially due to the network’s lack of redundancy following a
small-scale outage in Ohio, illustrates this.42

37. Growing criticism of utility infrastructure from environmental pressure
groups from the 1960s onward has made expansions of LIEs controversial.
“Blocking [the] Storm King [pumped hydroelectric storage facility in New York
in the 1960s] was seen by some as a pivotal step in the evolution of the
environmental movement. The critics who had found their voice and the
appropriate method for standing up to the giant corporation would hereafter be a
regular part of the culture of electricity, whether it concerned the siting of
transmission lines, the release of sulfur into the sky from a smokestack, the
killing of fish by heated water returning to a river from a power plant, or the
falling of coal particles into lungs and onto property.” SCHEWE, supra note 12, at
161.
38. Natural Gas Pipelines, P IPELINES 101 (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.pipeline101.com/overview/natgas-pl.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/D7WH-FZS3. See also Annual Report Mileage Summary Statistics, DEP’T
OF T RANSP . & H AZARDOUS M ATERIALS , http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site
/PHMSA/menuitem.7c371785a639 f2e55cf2031050248a0c
/?vgnextoid=3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextchann
el=3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print,
archived at http://perma.cc/T6WJ-7QYJ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
39. Id.
40. Transmission, EDISON ELEC. INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy
/transmission/Pages/default.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7TNH-YWZ4 (last
visited Sept. 30, 2014).
41. See National Broadband Plan Executive Summary, FCC xiv-xv (2010),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-executivesummary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P2WR-9L83 (describing goals of
expanding broadband access).
42. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 126–128 (noting that “[t]he 2003 blackout
demonstrated the grid’s complexity . . . and vulnerability.”). Id. at 128.
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Faced with important readjustments of legal rights among
numerous property owners brought on by the influx of LIEs, the
legal system should respond with innovative ways to better protect
landowners while allowing creation of needed infrastructure.
Eminent domain laws are outdated and fail to recognize that LIEs
result in a continuing relationship between the utility and the
landowner akin to an imposed cotenancy. Therefore, the current
system provides neither appropriate opportunities for input into the
terms of the LIEs from landowners nor adequate compensation for
their losses when utilities have the power of eminent domain and
can avoid negotiating with landowners. The good news is that
these problems are relatively straightforward and can be fixed
using traditional legal measures.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Large-scale infrastructure of the type involved in a typical LIE
creates a relationship between the LIE-holder and the servient
estate owner that is different from the relationship between
property owners in other easements. This section discusses the
types of demands this infrastructure makes on the property owners,
which fits poorly within the current approach to eminent domain
and easements.
A. Easement & non-easement eminent domain
In many eminent domain cases,43 the public entity acquires full
(fee) title to land needed for the project. This is often justified as
necessary to avoid holdout problems: if Texas wishes to build a
road from Lubbock to Austin, its engineers determine where the
optimal road location is (subject to political input), and the state
then forces property owners along the route to sell the state
sufficient land to construct the road.44 If the parties cannot agree on
43. Infrastructure takings are those done to build utility transmission lines
and similar structures. We therefore exclude Kelo-type takings from the
definition of infrastructure takings (although the property taken in that case was
“mysteriously” for “park support”). See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 495 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). There is a problem with eminent
domain abuse in Kelo-type circumstances (although opinions differ about the
extent), but it is a conceptually different problem since the paradigmatic Kelotype taking is simply redistributing property from A to B. A’s complaint is not
that A is forced into a continuing relationship with B but that A has lost her
property to B.
44. Of course, there might be political issues involved in the road’s location
as well. However, we set those aside here.
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the price, the law provides a procedure to determine “fair”
compensation.45 Proponents of eminent domain authority contend
that if the state had to negotiate with each landowner along the
route, bilateral monopoly problems would exist in which each
landowner would attempt to appropriate the surplus created by the
project by holding out to be the final seller.46 Critics have argued
that this overstates the problem: there are generally alternative
locations for much infrastructure that would enable public
authorities to avoid holdout problems,47 and spillover benefits of
many infrastructure projects cause many landowners to welcome
routing across their land.48 Nonetheless, the key is that once title to
the land for the road is taken by the state and the state’s check to
the landowner clears, there are almost no issues about which the
state and landowner continue to interact that are different from the
state’s interaction with any other property owner. In other words,
the former owner of the site of a road or school taken by eminent
domain does not retain a connection with the property that was
taken.
Conversely, in a LIE, the utility and landowner have an
ongoing relationship. The LIE significantly constrains the
landowner’s use of the servient estate. Range management is
significantly impacted by the presence of a LIE in ways that inhibit
the landowner from using standard methods of weed and brush
control. This is a serious problem. For example, Florida estimates
that weeds in pastures and rangeland generally cost its ranchers
45. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.014–21.018 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 530–31
(2009) (“Strategic behavior poses the central barrier to successful negotiations
overcome by eminent domain. Such behavior includes the closely related
problems of holdouts, bilateral monopoly, and asymmetric information.”).
47. Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as Justification for Eminent
Domain and the Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEPENDENT REV. 165, 170–71
(2005). See also John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and
Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 1, 15–16 (2005) (describing problems with allowing substitution of takings
(as liability rules) for negotiated transactions (as property rules) in easement
relocation cases).
48. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1223 (1967) (suggesting that the compensation requirement be relaxed “when
there are visible reciprocities of burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to
that for which compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other
people (indicating that settlement costs are high and that those sustaining the
burden are probably incurring relatively small net losses--else, being many, they
probably could have been mobilized to deflect the measure which burdens
them).”).

46

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

more than $180 million annually.49 Across the nation, noxious
weeds cost ranchers more than all other pests combined.50 The
impacts include:
[I]nterfering with grazing practices, lowering yield and
quality of forage, increasing costs of managing and
producing livestock, slowing animal weight gain, reducing
the quality of meat, milk, wool, and hides, and poisoning
livestock. In addition, infestations can reduce recreational
land values and the spiny species can cause human health
problems.51
Also, “weed infestations can reduce plant diversity, threaten rare
and endangered species, reduce wildlife habitat and forage, alter
fire frequency, increase erosion, and deplete soil moisture and
nutrient levels.”52
The presence of a LIE restricts ranchers’ ability to engage in
weed control through controlled burns, an important and widely
used technique.53 Moreover, as the utility regularly brings
equipment onto the LIE for purposes of inspection and service,
ranchers are dependent on the utility’s compliance with
49. B. A. Sellers & J.A. Ferrell, Weed Management in Pastures and
Rangeland – 2014, UNIV. OF FLA. AGRONOMY DEP’T UF/IFAS EXTENSION 1
(Jan. 2014), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/WG/WG00600.pdf, archived at http:
//perma.cc/CTC8-WPV2.
50. Joseph M. Ditomaso, Invasive Weeds in Rangeland: Species, Impacts,
and Management, 48 WEED SCI. 255, 257 (2000). The federal government has
designated 112 noxious weeds and state governments have designated many more,
see Federal Noxious Weeds, USDA NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV.,
http://plants.usda.gov/java/noxious?rptType=Federal, archived at http://perma.cc
/WU3G-EZ5M (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). For a typical best practices example,
see Best Management Practices for Controlling the Spread of Noxious Weeds,
GREATER YELLOWSTONE COORDINATING COMM. - TERRESTRIAL INVASIVE SPECIES
SUBCOMM. (2011), http://www.weedcenter.org/mrwc/docs/GYCC_final%20ER
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DRM3-QN2X.
51. Ditomaso, supra note 50, at 257.
52. Id.
53. See Larry D. White & C. Wayne Hanselka, Prescribed Range Burning
in Texas, TEX. A&M UNIV. (2000), http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/publications
/pwdpubs/media/pwd_bk_w7000_0196.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HB3WLYD7 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Lorie Woodward Cantu, Controlled Burn:
Focus Group Helps County Leaders Understand Controlled Burns, THE
CATTLEMAN (Feb. 2011), http://thecattlemanmagazine.com/archives/2011/02
/controlled-burn-Feb2011.html, archived at http://perma.cc/77B6-Y9PE (noting
that “[c]ontrolled burning can: help control unwanted plants such as Ashe
juniper and eastern red cedar; rearrange plant structure for wildlife; improve
forage quality for animals; encourage nutrient recycling; increase carbon
sequestration in the long term because of improved plant community vigor and
health”).
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burdensome weed control measures concerning vehicles. To see
how burdensome these measures are, consider that the Department
of Defense and the USDA require the use of commercial wash
units for vehicles going off-road on different federal sites.54 This
raises the question: If this is how government agencies treat their
own land, why are private landowners unable to insist on similar
comprehensive protection? Where utility crews work across broad
territories, the potential for spreading noxious weeds and other
contaminants is large.55 Note that these problems would not arise
where, as a result of an agreement between neighbors, a rangeland
parcel was burdened by an easement allowing a neighboring parcel
access to a road. Not only would the neighbors be able to negotiate
issues relating to range management in establishing the easement,
but their interests would be in relative harmony; both would be
interested in controlling invasive weed species to protect their
properties. By contrast, the utility owning the LIE has little interest
in controlling invasive species, except those that threaten their
lines (kudzu in the Southeastern United States being a prominent
example).56
Moreover, LIEs have a significant impact on the long-term
development potential of the burdened property. Consider a parcel
54. See Kimberley Taylor, et al., Washing Vehicles to Prevent Weed Seed
Dispersal, MONT. STATE UNIV. EXTENSION SERV. GUIDE (July 2011),
http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT201106AG.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/WC2K-D2BZ. This is not a trivial undertaking. The
Montana Extension Service describes the process as follows:
Commercial vehicle wash units typically clean mud and debris from
vehicles using undercarriage washers and high-pressure hand sprayers.
The wash water is then subjected to an extended filtration and settling
process, aimed at removing waste (sediment and other large particles)
from the water so that it can either be reused for future washes or
discarded.
Id.
55. Id. (“[O]nce seeds become attached to a vehicle, they can travel for
hundreds of miles under dry conditions before falling off . . . ”).
56. See William Atkinson, Taming the Vines, AM. PUBLIC POWER ASSOC.
(June 2011), http://www.publicpower.org/Media/magazine/ArticleDetail.cfm
?ItemNumber=32120, archived at http://perma.cc/V5YH-SAZK (describing
problems caused by kudzu and some other invasive species for electric utilities).
See also Jim Green, et al., Transmission Line Construction and Maintenance, in
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 12-1, 12-20
(Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012) (describing regulatory requirements for
vegetation management). Even if the utility cares about an invasive species like
kudzu, its crews may not and so there is a serious principal-agent issue even for
the subset of invasive species that might have an impact on the utility’s use of
the easement. Morriss’ in-laws’ and their neighbors’ experience with LCRA’s
failure to remove metal trash from the easement (which the utility promised to
do) across their property illustrastes this principal-agent problem.
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of unimproved farmland or rangeland. Its current use yields a
revenue stream from its agricultural production and possible
recreational uses (e.g., hunting leases). But it may also have future
potential to be subdivided into smaller parcels suitable for vacation
homes. In the western portion of the Texas hill country, for
example, an 80-acre parcel can support a cow-calf pair annually,
but it could also serve as a recreational site suitable for a residence.
Once a LIE is established, the recreational use is either no longer
available or has been reduced in value. The impact may appear in
both price reduction and increased marketing time. Thus, the
landowner has sustained the real loss of potentially converting a
portion of the property to recreational use. Since LIEs often
parallel roads, they are often imposed on the portions of the
property most easily converted to recreational uses. This represents
a significant loss for the rancher or farmer. This is not just a
pricing issue, because management of the LIE affects the
development potential of the remainder of the parcel. In a
voluntary creation of a LIE, the terms of the LIE would be
structured to maximize the joint surplus. When a utility can
unilaterally impose terms, it is unlikely to value the joint surplus
unless the development loss can be quantified at the time of the
taking.
There are multiple dimensions in which the utility owning a
LIE can negatively affect the value of property. The location of a
LIE across a parcel can have a significant impact on its future
development potential: an easement along one border is quite
different from an easement through the center of a property.57 The
use of different utility structures—monopoles rather than lattice
towers, for example—affects the aesthetics of the LIE;
consequently, the value of the property for recreational and other
uses is affected.58 The utility’s management practices also have an
impact. For example, utilities often clear-cut the entire easement.
In one specific case, this resulted in the loss of over 1,000 live oak

57. See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 400 S.W.2d 278
(Ark. 1966) (discussing dispute over location of easement within property).
58. George C. Karady, Environmental Impact of Transmission Lines, in
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 20-1, 20-3
(Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3rd ed. 2012) [hereinafter Karady, Environmental/Impact]
(describing monopoles as “less disturbing and aesthetically more pleasing”).
Monopoles can be used for non-extra high voltage lines. George G. Karady,
Concept of Energy Transmission and Distribution, in ELECTRIC POWER
GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 9-1, 9-6 (Leonard L. Grigsby
ed., 3d ed. 2012).
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trees greater than two inches in diameter on the three miles of 120foot wide clear-cut easement across the property.59
When the parties negotiate the terms of the LIE, the landowner
can seek accommodations that mitigate these impacts, and the
utility can offer different price-term combinations to landowners
with different preferences. Under eminent domain systems that
give the utility the unilateral right to determine the terms of the
easement and leave only the price term for third-party resolution,
this bargaining process does not occur.
State eminent domain laws largely date to the mid-twentieth
century.60 Despite a recent flurry of reforms aimed at stopping
Kelo-type abuses, the basic structure of the statutes remain
unchanged by those reforms, which were largely aimed at
removing or curbing eminent domain powers to take “blighted”
properties or to promote economic development.61 For “normal”
takings, our review of state statutes shows that 41 states62 provide
for a jury trial on damages, 29 allow ‘quick takes’ in at least some
circumstances before a court-supervised finding of damages is
reached, 25 require the taker to negotiate with the landowner, 23
relatively frequently shift litigation costs (including attorney’s
fees) for other than abandoned or invalidated takings,63 18 require
use of a commission or other body before a trial on damages, and
14 require the taker to procure appraisals before negotiating or, if
requested by the landowner, before filing a condemnation petition.
In general, there was a wave of eminent domain reforms starting in
the 1970s that added or restored jury trial rights and added cost
shifting provisions to state statutes. Together with the post-Kelo
reforms after 2005, the 1970s reforms were the last time there were
major changes to eminent domain law outside of individual states.
However, much has changed with respect to LIEs since the 1940s
and 1970s.64 Not only have networks vastly expanded, but public
59. Based on tree count done by Carol Akers in the case involving
Morriss’s inlaws’ property.
60. We had a research assistant compile a table of changes to state eminent
domain laws from World War II to the present. The discussion in this paragraph
is based on his work.
61. Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of
State Responses to Kelo, 17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237, 246 (2009).
62. We include the District of Columbia in the list of states.
63. State statutes are all over the map on this issue, so others might classify
the statutes slightly differently. We are confident that any observer would put
the range between 20 and 30.
64. Technical progress in the 1940s and 1950s “allowed higher voltages of
electricity to be transmitted over longer distances.” MUNSON, supra note 10, at
77. In addition, “the system of utility regulation [before deregulation]
encouraged expansion. Because a power company’s profits rose with the size of
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attitudes toward energy and telecommunications infrastructure
have changed. As population outside cities has expanded, valuation
of land unmarred by infrastructure has increased.65
In short, we contend that there is a significant difference
between a fee taking and an easement acquisition. The first
requires little interaction between utilities and property owners
after the take, while the latter mandates an ongoing relationship
between the two property owners who share ownership of the fee
simple bundle of rights to the tract of land under the LIE. One
example of how this difference plays out in practice comes from
the controversy over railroad land acquisition and later shifts in use
of abandoned rail networks.66 Where railroads acquired the rightsof-way through voluntary transactions, “most railroad corridors
held a wide variety of . . . interests, corresponding to the wishes
and desires of individual landowners.”67 “[I]n most land disputes
between the railroads and the original landowners” before the
1880s (the period when there was great enthusiasm for expanding
rail networks), “the railroads won because either the land granted
was found to be in fee simple absolute, or the railroads’ exclusivity
needs required a strong property interest. As public enthusiasm for
the railroads waned, however, so did judicial deference.”68 Over
time,
[C]ourts began to interpret the original granting documents
strictly and narrowly. If the railroad was still operating, it
would be deemed to hold only the smallest property right
possible consistent with its operational needs. If it had

its investments, more power plants and transmission lines translated into larger
returns.” Id. at 79. See also Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best
Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility
Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 149–56 (1998) (discussing rate of return
regulation).
65. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 87–88 (noting rise of protests over
transmission lines in 1970s); NYE, supra note 15, at 159 (noting the same).
66. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles:
Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements
from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351, 377
(2000) (“Some states . . . limited the types of property interests the railroads
could acquire through adverse possession or condemnation.”). See also Darwin
P. Roberts, The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad Rights-of-Way and
the Myth of Congress’s “1871 Shift,” 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 85, 148–49 (2011).
67. Wright & Hester, supra note 66, at 378. Railroads also acquired land
through adverse possession. Id. at 378–79. In a number of instances, records of
acquisition were lost. Id. at 379. Some states restricted the interests railroads
could acquire through adverse possession or by eminent domain. Id. at 379–80.
68. Id. at 378.
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abandoned its line, courts often found that the grant had
conveyed a mere easement that was extinguished by
abandonment.69
The continuing controversy over the shift of use of railroad rightsof-way to recreational trails is further evidence of the problems
that arise with changed uses.70
We now turn to an examination of how the law regulates
conflicts among property owners and how this framework operates
in the context of LIEs.
B. Legal frameworks for conflicts among property owners
In many instances, property owners’ rights may be limited
because of conflicts between neighbors over incompatible uses. As
Professor Casner observes:
The occupancy of neighboring tracts of land by different
individuals gives rise to probable conflicts of interests
between them. The interest of each, where such a conflict
exists, must be reasonably limited in order that the interest
of the other shall have reasonable play. In the mutual
accommodation that thus takes place each may suffer a
curtailment of the protection which would otherwise be
given to him. One may find that his interest in the use of
water on his premises may be limited so as to protect the
interest of his neighbor in the flow of water to his premises.
One may be limited in his freedom of excavation on his
premises in the protection of a desire or a possible desire by
his neighbor to build upon or otherwise improve his
premises. One may be prohibited from conducting himself
69. Id. at 378–79.
70. See, e.g., Andrea C. Ferster, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: A Review of
the Legal Issues, 58 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3 (2006) (outlining legal issues);
Cecilia Fex, The Elements of Liability in a Trails Act Taking: A Guide to the
Analysis, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 673 (2011) (noting the same legal issues); Preseault
v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (upholding Congressional
power to require “railbanking” of abandoned lines); Preseault v. United States,
100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality holding such efforts a taking under the
Fifth Amendment). But see Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 853 F.2d
145 (2d. Cir. 1988) aff’d 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding no taking). See also 16
U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2012) (National Trails System Act). Another significant
set of disputes over the terms of these land grants focused on whether they
included mineral rights. Thomas E. Root, Railroad Land Grants From Canals to
Transcontinentals, ABA Section of Natural Resources Law Monograph Series
No. 4, 37 - 42 (1987).
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in such a way as to interfere with the normal sleeping
habits of his neighbor.
Such mutual accommodations are commonly looked upon
as a normal incident of the protection of occupancy of land
in a crowded community. They are implicit in general
statements respecting the rights of possessors. They arise
out of the mere fact of impinging possessions. They do not
depend upon anything exceptional in the relationship of the
neighboring possessors. That two persons are neighbors is
sufficient to produce a qualification of the freedom of each
in the interest of the other.71
Where neighbors are unable to resolve such disputes through
negotiation, the law of nuisance serves as a check on conflicting
uses.72 Nuisance case law may be an “impenetrable jungle,”73 but it
serves the function of enabling courts to resolve conflicts the
parties are unable to resolve through negotiation.
Easements and their close relatives, real covenants and
equitable servitudes—all of which the Restatement of Property
(Third) now lumps into the single category of “servitudes”—are
important tools for adjusting neighbors’ relations through
voluntary transactions. In particular, servitudes resolve a problem
that mere contracts cannot; they enable the embedding of a
contractual solution between neighbors into the legal interest in the
land itself, ensuring that the agreement will continue to bind the
parties’ successors.74 Landowners voluntarily agree to impose

71. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (A. James Casner et al., eds., 1st ed., vol.
II 1952) [hereinafter II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY].
72. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL
PROPERTY § 13.4, at 350 (1992) (“One response to the unique nature of land is
the law of nuisance.”).
73. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (1971). But
see Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 326 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith,
eds. 2011) (arguing that nuisance is “a coherent body of rules that serves an
explainable function.”).
74. As Prof. Robert Natelson observes:
The law of running covenants permits the original covenantee and
covenantor to craft provisions mutually agreeable to them and tailored
to the relative situations of their parcels. These covenants are recorded,
providing prospective purchasers of dominant and servient estates with
more precise notice of their obligations than that afforded by the law of
nuisance . . . Thus, the doctrine of covenants running with the land is
designed to address the heavy and unique losses that neighboring uses
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servitudes on their land when doing so creates value. Thus, in
general, a servitude on Blackacre for the benefit of Whiteacre must
increase the value of Whiteacre by more than it diminishes the
value of Blackacre. If it does not, the owner of Blackacre will not
agree to it since the owner of Whiteacre will not be able to
compensate him sufficiently.75
Thus, when private property owner “A” creates an easement
across Blackacre (or another interest in it, such as a real covenant)
to benefit Whiteacre, the reason is usually that the combined value
of the parcels is enhanced by more than the transaction costs of
creating the easement or other interest.76 Often, A owns both
parcels involved at the time the servitude is created, and A’s
motivation is to enhance the combined property values. Suppose A
owns Blackacre, which is bounded by roads to the east and west
and by other properties to the north and south. If A subdivided
Blackacre into two new parcels along a north-south dividing line,
the western parcel’s value might be enhanced by an easement
offering access to the road along the eastern parcel’s eastern
edge.77 In creating the easement, A would be mindful of both the
increase in value to the western parcel from the access and the
decrease in value to the eastern parcel caused by providing the
easement. Thus A would locate the easement to find the
combination that minimizes the harm to the value of the eastern
parcel yet maximizes the value added to the western parcel.
If at a later date, when the eastern parcel has been transferred to
B and the western parcel to C, B and C found themselves in a
conflict over the easement, the law provides means for adjusting the
relationship. However, such conflicts would only arise after the
easement’s creation. Such conflicts might arise when the easement’s
terms are less than a complete contingent contract or when
can impose on a dominant owner while preserving relative freedom of
contract for the servient owner.
NATELSON, supra note 72, § 13.4, at 350–51. See also II AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.4, at 231 (“When created, [an easement] modifies
what would otherwise be the normal right of this possessor. If he is subject to
the burden of the easement, his possessory rights are less as against the owner of
the easement than they otherwise would be.”).
75. This follows from the basic law and economics analysis of contracts and
seems so obvious to us as to not require a citation.
76. Private property owner A might be motivated by benevolence toward
the owner of Whiteacre (as where Whiteacre is a property owned by a family
member), but we doubt that is likely to occur with LIEs with any frequency.
77. If one parcel was landlocked, the law would generally imply an
easement for access. In this hypothetical, neither parcel is landlocked but access
to one road is preferable.
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circumstances change to cause a problem not addressed by the
original easement’s terms. The latter would require an adjustment of
the terms. For example, many early railroad easements’ terms have
proven troublesome in the conversion of old rail right-of-ways into
bike trails.78
When the easement is created by agreement, the parties
negotiate the terms to address issues related to their sharing of the
portion of the servient tenement covered by the easement. In such
cases, it is not surprising that “courts stress the primary control
exercised by the language of the creating conveyance.”79 Courts
have been generally unwilling to allow servient estate or easement
owners to escape the consequences of their choices, forcing them to
rely on negotiations to change previously-negotiated easement
terms that one or the other no longer finds convenient.80 Easements
78. See Wright & Hester, supra note 66, at 378–79.
79. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 34-133. (Michael Allen
Wolf, ed., 2013) § 34.12 at 34–133. This is reinforced by what one court termed
the “fundamental principles of the law with regard to easements.” Stefanoni v.
Duncan, 923 A.2d 737, 745 (Conn. 2007). As the court in that case noted, “In
determining the character and extent of an easement created by deed, the
ordinary import of the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention of
the parties, unless there is something in the situation of the property or the
surrounding circumstances that calls for a different interpretation . . . . The use
of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate
as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.” (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Id. at 745.
80. See, e.g., Tarr v. Watkins, 4 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1960) (noting the court’s
refusal to allow a servient estate holder to move an easement providing access to
adjacent parcel merely because the location prevented construction of a home on
the property. The court stated the legal rule was “[o]nce the location of an
easement has been finally established, whether by express terms of the grant or
by use and acquiescence, it cannot be substantially changed without the consent
of both parties . . . . And the grantor has no right either to hinder the grantee in
his use of the way or to compel him to accept another location, even though a
new location may be just as convenient.”). Id. at 365. Similarly, in Merrill v.
Mfrs. Light & Heat Co., 185 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1962), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to allow the owner of mineral rights beneath a pipeline easement
to force the pipeline to be removed to permit strip mining where the terms of the
easement provided only that the servient estate holder was not liable for the
removal of surface support beneath the pipeline. Focusing on the language of the
easement (such as the use of the term “thereunder” rather than “thereupon” to
describe the obligation with respect to surface support), the common usage of
terminology (finding that “[t]he phrase ‘surface support’ is no esoteric word of
art known only to the mining engineer, but it is a term generally understood by
anyone familiar with the coal-mining regions of this Commonwealth”), the
custom of the industry, and the agreement as a whole, the court concluded that
the documents referred only to deep mining subsidence and not strip mining and
so the servient estate owner could not demand removal of the easement owner’s
pipeline. In cases where the creator of the easement fails to reserve rights it later

2014]

INVOLUNTARY COTENANTS

55

may also be created through prescription, implication, or
necessity.81 In these instances, the terms of the easement are
subjected to important checks, as the court creating the easement
must approve its terms.
LIEs created using eminent domain differ from virtually all
non-LIE easements in this respect: eminent domain LIEs are
created on terms established only by the utility, as current eminent
domain law gives the taker the unilateral power to set the terms of
the easement without review by a court or other body. Of course,
to the extent that such terms can be valued, the servient estate
holder may claim compensation for them through the eminent
domain process. However, as discussed below, many of these are
difficult to value, so pushing the issue into the valuation context is
problematic.
When easements are negotiated, the parties to the agreement
can address potential conflicts ex ante and create solutions to
potential problems in advance. For example, where an oil company
sought to lay pipelines through marshy land, the contract between
the oil company and the servient estate owner provided that if
servient estate holder notified the oil company in writing of a
breach of the terms of the easement, the easement would terminate
if the breach were not corrected within sixty days.82 Further, if the
easement was terminated, the oil company would have to remove
its pipelines and replace the dams the contract required it to
construct within 90 days.83 Finally, the contract provided for
liquidated damages of $100/day for failure to comply with either of
the above provisions, interest on the liquidated damages from the
date of termination and payment of any court costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees (“of not less than $5,000”) necessary for securing
compliance.84 The agreement also specified where dredging

wishes it had kept, courts have been unwilling to expand easements to
accommodate the easement holder. For example, where a utility objected to the
servient owner’s use of land under its power lines for a restaurant parking lot,
the California appeals court found no restriction in the terms of the easement
that would prevent such a use. As a result, the court concluded “We see no
reason why this court should make a gift to plaintiffs of valuable rights in real
property which they did not reserve in their original deed to defendants’
predecessors in interest.” City of Los Angeles v. Howard, 53 Cal.Rptr. 274, 280
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
81. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.3 at 230, § 8.32
at 256.
82. Pembroke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 454 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1971).
83. Id. at 608–09.
84. Id. at 609.
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material would be placed.85 When the oil company failed to
comply with the agreement by allowing subsidence of the canal
banks to widen the canal, the servient estate holder sued to enforce
the conditions and won.86
These provisions were well-crafted responses to problems
anticipated by the parties. As the court noted in finding for the
servient estate holder, the land was marshy terrain which “was
unstable to the extent that for each foot dredged vertically there
would eventually be lateral subsidence of each bank so as to
increase the width at a rate of 2.75 to 3 feet for each foot of vertical
depth dredged.”87 As a result, the court concluded that the oil
company “knew full well that the banks of the canal would slide
into the water” and broaden the canal beyond the permissible scope
of the easement unless the oil company “sloped” the banks.88
However, the court found that “for its own purposes and knowing
full well the probable result, [the oil company] chose to attempt to
dredge and excavate . . . without the required slope.”89 The parties
had thus constructed an enforceable incentive system, including
liquidated damages and termination provisions, with which to
govern their relationship that addressed a specific problem
anticipated by the servient estate owner. Not every easement
involves such well-thought-out mechanisms for crafting appropriate
incentives for the parties, and if they do not, it is a result of the
parties’ choices about the amount of resources to invest in crafting
the terms of their easements.90
By contrast, in a LIE created through eminent domain, the
utility can unilaterally dictate the terms. A LIE provides no
opportunity for the servient estate holder (who likely has the best
knowledge about both physical and financial conditions) to
negotiate for incentives that will induce the utility to conduct its
operations on the easement in a way that minimizes the harm to the
servient estate or to negotiate liquidated damages or termination to
govern breaches.
Moreover, when an easement is created by negotiation, the
servient estate holder may retain more of the “bundle of sticks” of
85. Id. at 609 n.2.
86. Id. at 613.
87. Id. at 610.
88. Pembroke, 454 F.2d at 611.
89. Id.
90. This can also be determined based on the parties’ actions. 2 THOMPSON,
supra note 8, §332 at 112 (noting that “[w]here the terms of the instrument
granting an easement are vague or indefinite, the easement may be construed in
accordance with the uniform acts of the parties in using and enduring it for many
years and so evidencing their intent”).
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property rights than is possible when another dictates the easement
terms. For example, a landowner and a town negotiated an
easement allowing the town sewer board to cross the landowner’s
property to reach its sewer plant and to construct a pipeline from
the plant to the plant’s lagoon system. When the board attempted
to grant a right to use the easement to another landowner to allow
him to reach his property,91 the servient estate holder objected, and
the court agreed, that the sewer board lacked the authority to
enlarge its easement by allowing the neighbor to make use of it.
This fact situation is likely to arise with respect to many LIEs
involving transmission towers. A utility can expand its use of a
LIE to incorporate additional lines or other utilities’ lines (e.g.,
adding a telecommunications cable to an electrical transmission
tower).92 The ability to increase the height of towers, the number
of towers, or the width of the arms on electrical towers are all
powers that utilities regularly include in LIEs created through
eminent domain. Valuing a hypothetical future expansion in an
eminent domain can be challenging, yet all of these factors have a
major impact on the amount of damage to the servient estate.
Allowing the utility to unilaterally set the terms of the easement to
include expansion allocates more of the benefit of the bargain,
between the buyer and seller of the easement, to the buyer by
preventing the seller from capturing a portion of the value of

91. See Phillips v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the Town of Ariton, 27
So.3d 1206, 1207 (Ala. 2009). See also Capital Elec. Power Ass’n v. Hinson, 84
So.2d 409, 462 (Miss. 1956) (finding that utility could not expand easement for
power distribution line to serve an adjacent property once it had fixed location
of easement by building original line, holding “that where there is a grant of a
right of way easement which is in general terms as to location, length, or
terminal points, and is therefore uncertain and ambiguous, it should be
interpreted by reference to all attendant circumstances, including the purposes
contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of the grant; and the
extent of the servitude is determined by ascertaining what is necessary to
accomplish the purpose contemplated by the parties when the grant is made, as
to which consideration should be given to the practice interpretation put upon
the grant by the acts of the parties in the use of the grant”).
92. Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC typically includes the following
language in its easements allowing it to install infrastructure:
[T]o excavate, grade, remove obstructions, construct, maintain, and
operate electric power and communication lines, each consisting of
variable number of wires and cables, and all necessary or desirable
appurtenances including supporting structures, foundations, guy wires,
and guy anchorages over, under, across, and upon the Easement
Property.
See infra app. 3.
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additional lines.93 Particularly where eminent domain
compensation rules focus on the loss to the servient estate (e.g.,
93. See, e.g., Talty v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 347 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976) (finding utility whose easement was granted by state agency over
private property, could expand tower size and voltage of transmission lines
within the scope of the easement it had acquired). A Maryland case presents an
example of the servient estate holder possibly unsuccessfully attempting to
bargain for additional compensation for expansion of the use of an easement for
gas pipelines. See Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 194 A.2d 636, 639 (Md.
1963). The easement provided that the gas company could install up to four
additional pipelines within the first ten years of the easement upon paying a
specified fee. Rather than add a line, however, the gas company replaced its
existing line with a larger line that had an additional 75% capacity. The court
rejected the argument that expanding the pipeline to a larger diameter would
allow the gas company to indirectly accomplish the expansion without paying
the fee. Rather, the court found, the additional fee provision covered creating
additional trenches for new pipelines “would be less area to which the appellants
could have free and full use of their property.” Id. at 639. Given this
interpretation of the language of the easement, the court then found there was no
violation of its terms to replace the existing pipeline with a larger capacity one.
Since the new pipe had additional safety features and “was laid in the same
exact location, no additional trench was necessary, and certainly it can not [sic]
seriously be contended that the extra four inches of space in the ground the new
pipe occupies is a substantial burden on the servient estate. It would be a
different situation if the trench were much larger or if the pipe were sufficiently
close to the surface to adversely affect its use by the servient property owners.”
However, it noted that “[t]he expiration of the option meant that no more land
could be burdened with additional lines in the absence of further negotiations
and payment therefor.” Id.
Note that bundling additional lines into a transmission line is generally
cost efficient. See BLUME, supra note 14, at 50. However, in comparing a
willing buyer-willing seller transaction to a condemnation award, the seller’s
willingness to pay (measured by the total capacity the seller believes the LIE can
handle taking into account the seller’s demand for capacity) should be relevant.
In some instances, legislatures have intervened to allocate those gains to
distribution easement holders. See, e.g., Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212
Cal.Rptr. 31, 34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding adding cable television lines
to existing utility poles within the scope of the easement despite explicit
language requiring servient landowner consent to changes because “[a]lthough
the cable television industry did not exist at the time the easement was granted,
it is part of the natural evolution of communications technology” citing state
statute allowing utilities to provide access to their easements as evidence of “a
strong public policy in favor of encouraging the type of cable attachments in this
case.”); Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision System, Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (finding that adding cable equipment to existing
distribution lines would not impose an additional burden, was consistent with
the policy of broadly interpreting easements to meet progressive inventions, and
that cable television rendered a valuable educational and public service despite
explicit language in easement requiring servient landowner consent). Similarly,
California permitted the City of Los Angeles to replace a street railway with
buses without violating the terms of the easement for the street railway, finding
that “[f]ifty years of technological change, embracing developments in internal
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how much does the LIE reduce the value of the property) rather
than the benefit of the LIE to the utility (e.g., how much revenue
from use of the LIE can the utility generate), an eminent domain
award will give the utility more of the surplus than it might receive
in an arm’s length bargaining situation where its willingness to pay
would be a relevant variable.94 Further, as the additional damage
from expanding a LIE in the future is difficult to value, the
landowner will be undercompensated to the extent the eminent
domain process cannot fully capture the value of the future
damage.
Eminent domain thus results in a different outcome than would
occur in a voluntary transaction. Where a willing buyer and seller
negotiate the terms of a contract, the buyer’s willingness to pay is
bounded by the benefits it receives from acquiring the property and
the opportunity cost of its next best use of the resources in
question; the seller’s willingness to accept is bounded by the
opportunity cost of rejecting the offer and the value of the property
in its existing use. The substitution of market valuation of property
in the absence of the LIE means that courts will, at best,
imperfectly assess the price at which a voluntary contract would
occur. This problem is well known in the eminent domain
literature.95 It is an inevitable consequence of the substitution of a
judicial determination of price for a market determination.
However, the problem is worse in the LIE context than elsewhere.
Utilities’ unilateral power to shape easement terms that leave
the door open to additional uses of the easement in the future are
particularly problematic as they are extremely difficult to value
today. For example, in the easement Oncor Electric Delivery
Company condemned on properties in Texas, the company
included the ability to install “all necessary or desirable
appurtenances.”96 This leaves to Oncor’s judgment the decision of

combustion vehicles and techniques of highway construction, have undoubtedly
produced a situation in which motor buses have won public preference because
of their greater flexibility of route and schedule.” Faus v. City of Los Angeles,
431 P.2d 849, 852 (Cal. 1967). That the plaintiff was an entrepreneur who had
obtained assignments of the interests of the original servient tenement owners
may have also had an impact on the decision.
94. To the extent that eminent domain encourages utilities to pursue LIEs
that are profitable only if they can purchase the property at the lower price
enabled by eminent domain, it may result in misallocation of capital by the
utilities.
95. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 68 (1986).
96. See infra app. 3.
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what to place on the easement in the future. The phrase used is so
vague that it implies virtually no limit on what Oncor could place
on the easement, contrary to the normal practice with respect to
easements.97 Reducing the future value of the easement to a current
payment is virtually impossible,98 making it highly likely that the
landowner will be undercompensated for ceding significant control
over the land to the LIE owner.
Including broad terms in easements incentivizes utilities to use
eminent domain rather than bargain to create LIEs and avoids
efficient solutions to potential conflicts. In a voluntary negotiation
over an easement, where a landowner sought an easement
provision that the utility could provide more cheaply than the
landowner could obtain elsewhere, the gains from trade would
motivate the parties to include the term. For example, landowners
may be concerned about potential lawsuits over incidents involving
LIEs since the infrastructure placed on the LIE is frequently
dangerous. Because the utility has a significant degree of control
over the operation of the infrastructure and the risks involved, and
because the utility is in the best position to insure against such
risks, one would expect that utilities could offer indemnification
and insurance to the landowner at a significantly lower cost than
the individual landowner could procure elsewhere (if such
insurance were even commercially available). It has been our
experience that utilities not using eminent domain to procure LIEs
often provide indemnification and insurance to the servient estate
holder. However, if the cost of procuring alternative insurance is
difficult to prove—as it is where the insurance is not commercially
available—a utility using eminent domain has little incentive to
offer to provide indemnification and insurance. This is because
making the offer will not affect the eminent domain award by
much, but the offer will increase the utility’s costs. Thus, wherever
the price of not providing indemnification in the eminent domain
proceeding is less than the cost of providing it, the utility will not
97. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §426 at 657 (“The dominant owner cannot
increase the burden of the easement without the consent of the servient owner.
The owner of a right-of-way cannot materially increase the burden of the
servient estate nor impress and new and additional burden thereon. But normal
development by the owner of the easement is permissible.”).
98. The current value would be a function of the probability distribution of
future uses as well as the harm caused by such uses in the future. Even if the
utility provided good faith estimates of its possible future uses, something we
are skeptical would occur, those estimates would be inaccurate. Leaving the
valuation damage caused by future uses until it occurs by restricting eminent
domain-based LIEs to specified uses or leaving the matter to negotiation, would
postpone the valuation until more information was available, reducing
uncertainty.
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do so even if the benefit to the landowner of the indemnification
exceeds the cost to the utility of providing it.
Indemnification is an excellent example because it is such an
important factor for landowners who face significant risk from
LIEs on their properties. For example, under Texas law, certain
activities are prohibited around high voltage overhead lines. Not
only are there criminal penalties for engaging in such activities
(including operating certain types of machinery without a
statutorily required warning),99 but the statute provides civil
liability for the property owner in favor of the utility for any
contacts with the line in violation of the statute.100 In a 1984
federal court opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute’s
inclusion of a provision providing that:
[I]f a violation of this chapter results in physical or
electrical contact with a high voltage overhead line, the
person, firm, corporation, or association that committed the
violation is liable to the owner or operator of the line for all
damages to the facilities and for all liability that the owner
or operator incurs as a result of the contact.101
This meant that the utility was completely indemnified by the
landowner for any claims arising out of any violation of the statute
even for the utility’s own negligence.102 A subsequent Texas court
opinion extended this interpretation to hold the “violator”
responsible for the power line operator’s attorney’s fees, costs, and
interest.103 Under the literal terms of the statute, the landowner
would also be responsible for damages and attorney’s fees in any
lawsuit brought by a customer against the utility for a service
interruption caused by the utility’s own negligence if the
landowner’s conduct was also a factor in the accident.104
In general, servitudes provide a mechanism by which property
owners can create permanent solutions that reallocate property
rights to maximize the total value of a bundle of rights. Where a
99. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 752.007 (West 2010).
100. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 752.008 (West Supp. 2014).
101. Moore v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 737 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1436c, emphasis omitted).
102. Id.
103. Olson v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 803 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. App.
1991).
104. By contrast, the default rule for easements was traditionally that the
“owner of an easement or right-of-way over the lands of another must maintain
it in a state of good repair and efficiency so that no unnecessary damage will
result from its use to the servient estate.” 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 428 at
674.
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particular use does not require fee ownership, such reallocations
are efficient. Recognizing that these reallocations may create
future conflicts, the parties to voluntarily negotiated reallocations
can create—and courts will enforce—mechanisms to incentivize
value-maximizing behavior and to compensate for failure to
deliver on promises. Not all easements are created as the result of
negotiation, however, and the next subsection examines the lessons
for LIEs of how courts create easements in the absence of
negotiation.
C. Courts’ capability to address LIEs
When an easement is created by prescription, implication, or
necessity, the court deciding the case sets the terms of the
easement.105 As a substitute for bargaining, courts have taken on
the role of settling the terms of the easement. Notably, easements
by necessity are rarely created simply because “the claimant would
have to spend substantial time or money to construct a road on his
or her own land.”106 Rather, they require relatively stringent
conditions be satisfied, generally including a prior unity between
the burdened and benefited parcels.107 This reluctance to substitute
court-ordered property relationships for bargaining suggests the
judiciary has recognized the problems created by involuntary
easements.108 When a court has made such a substitution, the
105. Even in these cases, the courts historically used the language of intent. 4
POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[1] at 3447. Powell argues that “[t]hese fictional
implications of ‘intent’ are actually rooted in considerations of public policy.”
Id. See also 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §351 at 287 (“Theoretically, an implied
easement is based on the presumed intention of the parties as garnered from the
surrounding circumstances rather than on the language of the deed.”).
106. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[3] at 3457.
107. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 3.08(a), 3.08(12)-(13) (2d ed.
2004). See also 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §355, at 34245 (describing limitations
on easements by necessity).
108. Even with easements created by agreement, where the parties have left
terms unspecified, the courts must sometimes step in to craft a solution to a
conflict. See, e.g., McConnell v. Golden, 247 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1968) (court held to
designate location for easement where servient estate owner had refused to do so
for 15 years and there was no agreement as to location of easement); Daniel v.
Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (finding that trial court had
authority to locate easement in a case where the lack of evidence on the issue
because of parties’ failure to previously locate easement or use it regularly
“taxes the best resources of judicial ingenuity.”). See also Ark. Valley Elec.
Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 400 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Ark. 1966) (court noting in dicta
that trial court would have been justified in placing easement for power line
where it minimized damage to servient estate.) This role for the courts in
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authorities generally argue that the easements must be interpreted
flexibly, to adapt to the “well-known likelihood of changing
property uses.”109 This is quite different from courts’ approach to
easements created voluntarily, where they are more inclined to
force the property owners to live with the bargain they struck.
Moreover, at least some courts have claimed the equitable power
to alter the terms of easements by necessity after their creation, and
have specifically distinguished easements created by courts from
those created by the parties through a document; the Third
Restatement has adopted this position as well.110
Indeed, courts are frequently willing to engage in relatively
aggressive interpretation of easements to resolve conflicts between
the dominant and servient interest owners. For example:
[I]t is often said that the parties are presumed to have
contemplated such a scope for the created easement as
would reasonably serve the purposes of the grant. This
provides a factor of elasticity, which has been most useful.
Under this presumption, many courts have liberally read in
expansions of the permitted use caused by technological
innovations, by subsequent developments of the locality, or

handling conflicts caused by changes in land use where the easement is created
involuntarily is consistent with our view that a check on unilateral creation of
terms in eminent domain proceedings is needed.
109. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.079[3] at 34-56.1. See also 2 THOMPSON,
supra note 8, §366 at 420 (noting the use of an implied way of necessity “must
be as reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature and
purposes permit. Whenever an easement has arisen from necessity, it is
generally held coextensive with the reasonable need, present and future, of the
dominant estate for such a right or easement, and to vary with the necessity, in
so far as may be consistent with the full, reasonable enjoyment of the servient
estate as the nature and purposes permit.”).
110. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 591 S.E.2d 34, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that “[m]any of the cases adopting the traditional rule deal with express
easements-not with easements created by necessity. We recognize that it should
be more difficult to relocate an express easement, as it is akin to a contract and
is bargained for by the parties.”); Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997); Kline v. Bernardsville Ass’n, Inc., 631 A.2d 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993); RFS, Inc., v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
Ramsey v. Johnson, 312 So.2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Sedillo Title Guaranty,
Inc. v. Wagner, 457 P.2d 361 (N.M. 1969); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.8. But see Thomason v. Kern & Co., 376 S.E.2d
872 (Ga. 1980); Edgell v. Divver, 402 A.2d 395 (Del. Ch. 1979); Davis v. Bruk,
411 A.2d 660 (Me. 1980); Daviess-Martin County v. Meadows, 386 N.E.2d
1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
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by changes in the use of the dominant parcel said to have
been contemplated by the parties.111
This willingness to aggressively resolve ambiguities or changed
circumstances, for which the parties did not provide, illustrates
both the capacity of courts to address the details of easements, and
the need for them to do so in circumstances where the parties have
failed to do so ex ante. It is thus a peculiarity that courts, with such
broad powers to expand easements, do not also have a similar
power to control the shaping of easements when the easements are
taken without negotiation by eminent domain. Granting the courts
such power is thus both consistent with existing practice with
respect to non-eminent domain, non-LIE easements and the
capacity of courts generally to serve as an alternative to bargaining
ex post where the bargaining did not take place.
D. Joint ownership as a model
Although the interests in LIEs taken by utilities for
transmission lines, pipelines, and telecommunications lines are
formally easements, we contend that the relationships LIEs create
are in many respects closer to a tenancy in common in the
underlying land than an easement.112 Easements often deal with
restrictions on a landowner’s use of his land (e.g., restraints on
building to prevent blocking views or, more recently, to promote
conservation) or with permitting activities that would otherwise be a
trespass (e.g., crossing land). Easements were traditionally
considered non-possessory land interests,113 involving only “a
limited use or enjoyment of the servient tenement.”114 Common-law
easements were thus “a negative thing, a right or privilege to be
immune from action if one made a certain use of another’s realty. It
did not contemplate compelling another to take a positive action
111. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.12 at 34–140 to 34–142; Jakobsen v.
Colonial Pipeline Co. 397 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. 1990); Westphal v. Kentucky
Utilities Co. 343 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
112. One important legal difference between concurrent ownership of
interests in land and easements is that concurrent ownership interests “as the
term is generally understood, is simultaneously ownership of (the same)
individual interests in property. Thus, if A and W together own a present interest
in land for the life of A, then A and W are co-owners.” NATELSON, supra note
72, § 2.7, at 31. The simplest cotenancy is the tenancy in common, which
requires only that the cotenants own the same interest in the land. See Id. § 2.10,
at 37.
113. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.01[1], at 34-5 (noting that easements
are “non-possessory land interests”).
114. Id. § 34.02[1], at 34-11.
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with respect to his own property for the benefit of the person
holding the easement.”115 This is less true of LIEs than easements,
as the utility is not only sharing possession of the land with the
servient estate holder by physically placing structures on the land
which significantly limit the servient estate holder’s ability to use
the land, but it is also likely to be regularly present physically on
the land to conduct inspection and maintenance.
This is particularly true where the existence of the easement
compels a change in land management practices, or where the
utility’s actions have significant impacts on the landowner. For
example, controlling invasive weeds requires careful management
of vehicle traffic on agricultural land to prevent weed seeds being
carried from one area from taking hold in another, as well as
restoration of land disturbed by activity, periodic inspections of
property disturbed, and revegetation of disturbed areas.116 It also
requires regular burning of the land, something often not possible
when there is a LIE.
A similar problem comes with the broad access to the property
included in utility-drafted LIEs. For example, Oncor typically
includes the right to install as many gates as it wishes in the
landowner’s fence to allow access to its easement.117 This is a
significant reduction in rural landowners’ ability to control access
to their properties—something that is particularly important in
protecting livestock and limiting access to authorized persons
during hunting season. Moreover, not only does Oncor claim the
right to enter the easement at any time without notice to the
landowner, but also, the terms of its easement place no limit on the
number of duplicate keys it can distribute for the locks on those
gates.118 This loss of control is particularly difficult to value in the
condemnation process, as there is no market for such access rights
115. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 318, at 31.
116. See supra notes 49 to 53 and accompanying text.
117. See infra app. 3.
118. See infra app. 3. The valuation of this loss of control is particularly
problematic. Rural landowners may be – certainly if our experience is any guide,
they definitely are – particularly sensitive to issues of access to their land. But
even setting aside any particular sensibility, control of access is both important
with respect to protecting livestock from theft and the value of hunting rights.
On the former, consider the key role of control of access from the initial
settlement of the portion of the Great Plains in Texas compared to the
experience in the northern plains, where the presence of public land prevented
such control. See Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to its Private Roots, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 554–58 (2001); Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes &
Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law,
33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 601–07 (1998).
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because few landowners would consent to unlimited distribution of
keys to their gates by third parties.
Property law regularly deals with jointly owned property. A
and B may own Blackacre as joint tenants or cotenants (or, if
married and in a state which recognizes the estate, as tenants by the
entirety). Joint owners of property have well-defined legal rights
and obligations, which courts turn to in the event of a disagreement
among the joint owners. Moreover, there are well-established
remedies, including judicial partition or sale of property when the
joint owners are in conflict. Generally, the law provides three key
methods of resolving conflicts among co-owners of land that
would address the problems existing in LIE relationships.
First, and most importantly, co-owners have a right of exit
from the relationship available to them. When tenants in common
or joint tenants no longer wish to be cotenants, they have the right
to partition.119 “Every cotenant has the right to compel partition”
unless the cotenants’ agreements or acts modify or eliminate that
right.120 The right to partition “is unconditional and cannot be
defeated by a mere showing that a partition would be inconvenient,
injurious, or even ruinous to an adverse party.”121 The right “is
designed to prevent a forced continuation of shared ownership of
property.”122 As Powell notes, “[t]o deny it is to effectively expand
the property rights of one cotenant at the expense of other
cotenants.”123 This is similar to the right of exit in partnerships and
reflects similar concerns: where the parties do not share a common
objective, forcing them into an economic union is particularly
problematic. 124
119. Indeed, joint tenants (who share a right of survivorship) have an even
more powerful right of partition, for any may sever one the four unities required
to create a joint tenancy by conveying his or her interest to some other person.
NATELSON, supra note 72, § 2.8, at 34.
120. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[1], at 50–37. Interests insufficient to
create cotenancies do not create the right to partition. II AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.22 at 98 (“Persons having interests in the property
which do not make them cotenants cannot maintain an action of partition.
Therefore a widow having a right of dower cannot enforce partition, nor can her
dower be affected by partition between the co-owners of the fee which must be
made subject to her dower in the absence of a statute to the contrary.”).
121. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[3][a], at 50–41.
122. Id. at 50-41 to 50-42 (citing Eisenberg v. Tuchman, 892 A.2d 1016
(Conn. App. 2006)).
123. Id. (citing Robinson v. Evans, 554 A.2d 332 (D.C. 1989)).
124. Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissolution, 65
Wash. U. L. Q. 357, 390 (1987) (“an individual partner who is locked into a
partnership after circumstances cause the relationship to become onerous may
suffer substantial losses in the value of his financial and human capital over an
extended period. A partner’s abusive exercise of the dissociation right may
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Partitions may be accomplished by judicial division or by sale
and division of the proceeds.125 Common law partition was
equitable in nature, which “suggests that courts should consider all
relevant circumstances to ensure that complete justice is done.”126
In addition, as Professor Casner notes, partition serves the interests
of judicial economy as well, preventing the courts from being
drawn into “the many questions which may arise between the
cotenants in their use and enjoyment of the common property. The
law cannot possibly settle such details where the cotenants do not
agree.”127 Given the large number of margins on which utilities
and many landowners must continually interact as a result of the
taking of a LIE, providing a right of exit is both necessary to level
the playing field for bargaining, and allows landowners to end
dysfunctional relationships with utilities. One might object that
allowing landowners to exit would cause serious problems for the
operation of a transmission line or pipeline. But the most likely
consequence of allowing a right of exit as the default would not be
idiosyncratic use of exit rights after the utility had constructed its
line or pipeline but negotiations at the inception of the relationship
over the conditions under which exit might be exercised.
Moreover, providing exit rights in involuntary easements would
incentivize utilities to negotiate voluntary LIEs rather than use
eminent domain. Additionally, exit rights can be limited in scope
to prevent stranding capital investments. For example, they might
be exercisable only at particular intervals.
Second, cotentants owe each other a duty not to commit
waste.128 In the past, issues concerning waste often arose in the
context of a life tenant and remainderman, and the courts had some
difficulty in specifying the contours of the doctrine where there

cause all of the non-dissociating partners to give up partnership assets without
adequate compensation or to lose the benefit of firm specific human capital. But
even if the non-dissociating partners as a group might suffer a greater loss in the
event of abusive dissociation than a single locked-in partner might suffer
without a dissociation right, each partner is more likely ex ante to focus on his
risk than on the aggregate. Assuming the partners cannot predict ex ante whether
they will belong to the dissociating or the non-dissociating group, they would
want an agreement that minimized the graver costs borne by locked-in partners.
Moreover, on a more objective basis, a loss that is spread among individuals has
less impact than the same loss borne by one individual.”).
125. See 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[1], at 50-37. Partition in kind is
the default unless the parties stipulate to a sale, prove a physical division cannot
be fairly done or is impracticable. Id. § 50.07[4][a], at 50-46.2.
126. Id. § 50.07[3][a], at 50-41.
127. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.18 at 78.
128. See 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.03[3], at 50-21.
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were co-owners in fee. A review of American precedent led to
what Casner termed “hopeless confusion.”129 Doing the best he
could with the confusion, Casner’s treatise, The American Law of
Property, concluded that “a cotenant in fee is properly liable for
waste when his use of the property is not in the exercise of his right
of reasonable enjoyment, and when such use results in permanent
injury to the property.”130 Under English precedent, following the
Statute of Anne, cotenants must account to other cotenants if the
cotenant obtains “more than his just share and proportion” of the
rewards of ownership.131 In the United States, most states follow a
more expansive rule requiring the occupying cotenant to “account
for outside rental income received for use of the land, offset by
credits for maintenance expenses. If the use, such as extracting
minerals, reduces the value of the property, the occupant must
account for the income.”132 Similarly, where one owner has a right
to remove materials from the real property of another, courts have
held that each “was entitled to prevent the other from exercising its
rights of ownership of the severed estate arbitrarily, capriciously,
oppressively or wantonly, but each must engage in reasonable,
prudent management.”133
Incorporating the duties not to commit waste or to “engage in
reasonable, prudent management” into LIEs would provide a
flexible means to address the myriad issues that might arise
between a landowner and a utility over shared access to a LIE,
without requiring full specification of all issues in advance. For
example, many rangeland landowners license hunters to use
servient tenements, including the area covered by the easement. A
utility that scheduled inspection and maintenance work during
hunting season would interfere with hunting access, both by
scaring game and by limiting hunters’ ability to hunt in areas
where crews were working. The duty not to commit waste could be
used to require a utility that reduced the hunting value of the
servient estate to compensate the landowner.
Third, at times the law imposes a fiduciary relationship on
cotenants, “which may require a cotenant to protect and secure
129. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.15 at 65.
130. Id. at 66.
131. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[1], at 50-22 (quoting 4 Anne ch. 16 §
27 (1705)).
132. Id. § 50.04[1], 50-23 to 50-24.
133. 1A THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 164, at 69–70. Thompson also notes that
“[i]n a mineral lease, the surface estate is servient to the mineral estate for the
purpose of the mineral grant, but even such right is to be reasonably exercised
with due regard to the rights of the owner of the surface.” Id. § 164, at 75. It also
must be exercised in light of “the custom of the community.” Id. § 164, at 77.
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their common interests.”134 For example, where one cotenant
insured a property against fire, she was required to share the
proceeds with the other cotenants despite having been the only one
to pay the premiums and the only one named on the policy.135 This
duty justifies applying “close scrutiny” to dealings between
cotenants “to guard against fraud or overreaching.”136 This
suggests a rationale for courts to give close scrutiny to dealings
between the eminent domain taker and the landowner. In the
business law context, fiduciary obligations are often justified as a
majoritarian default rule.
Larry Ribstein, who took a relatively narrow view of the scope
of fiduciary duties, argued that this was justified because “[a] duty
of self-abnegation is only rarely appropriate in a competitive
marketplace. Such a duty is usually excessively costly when applied
to commercial dealings because it undermines the incentives that
motivate business people to provide high-quality goods and
services.”137 Ribstein contended that in business, the rule should
focus “on the particular type of entrustment that arises from a
property owner’s delegation to a manager of open-ended
management power over property without corresponding economic
rights.”138 This certainly would include the owner of an
involuntarily-granted LIE. If landowners and utilities which exercise
eminent domain to take a LIE are viewed as being in an involuntary
business relationship, with the problem of maximizing the joint
surplus from the simultaneous operation of the LIE and the servient
estate, imposing fiduciary obligations on both parties to the
easement can substitute for considerable detail in specifying the
terms.

134. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[3], at 50-28 (citing Edwards v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co, 823 S.W.2d 903 (Ark. 1992); Caffey v. Caffey 625 S.W.2d
444 (Ark. 1981); Brown v. Brown, 563 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1978)). See also 1A
THOMPSON, supra note 8, §170, at 101–102 (“Like lateral cotentants, tenants in
common, joint tenants and tenants by the entireties, vertical cotenants, mineral
severances, mineral lessees, purchasers of profits and owners of the freehold
have a certain amount of fiduciary relationship.”).
135. Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 903 (Ark. 1992).
136. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[3], at 50-28 (citing Rose v. Roso, 204
P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1950); McArthur v. Dumaw, 43 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. 1950);
Watts v. Krebs, 962 P.2d 387 (Idaho 1998); Howard v. Wactor, 41 So.2d 259
(Miss. 1949); Dolan v. Cummings, 102 N.Y.S. 91 (1907) aff’d 86 N.E. 1123
(N.Y. 1908); Sperry v. Tolley, 199 P.2d 542 (Utah 1948); Woodard v.
Carpenter, 195 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1948)).
137. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV.
899, 903 (2011).
138. Id. at 901.
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Both the duty to avoid waste and fiduciary obligations might
address two important issues that arise in LIEs. First, in general,
the default rule for easements is that the responsibility for
maintenance and repair costs necessary “for the full enjoyment of
the easement” rests with the easement owner; “the dominant owner
is normally considered to have a duty to make such repairs as are
necessary to permit the servient owner to have reasonable use of
his or her tenement, and to have the privilege of making such
repairs as are necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the
easement was created.”139 Second, utilities make use of contractors
for work on easements and sometimes argue they are not liable for
harms created by these contractors.140
E. Joint ownership issues
Where two or more owners share interests in land, the law
sometimes has to confront “[m]ore complex problems”141 than
when neighbors’ use of land causes conflicts. This section
discusses how these affect the relationship between utilities and
servient estate holders in the context of LIEs in three areas:
interpreting the easement terms, modification of the easement, and
termination of the easement.
1. Interpreting terms
LIEs are burdensome for the servient estate holder for many
reasons. The most obvious—literally—is that the infrastructure
placed on LIEs is often unattractive. Reportedly, Frank Lloyd
Wright phoned President Franklin D. Roosevelt to demand the
removal of high-voltage lines obstructing the view from his
Scottsdale, Arizona home.142 Infrastructure interferes with radio
and television signals.143 It can charge ungrounded nearby
objects,144 which can be a problem for rural landowners who have
metal fencing, gates, and irrigation equipment near LIEs. It
139. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.12, at 34-146 to 34-147.
140. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
141. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[1], at 34-49.
142. Karady, Environmental Impact supra note 58, at 20-1.
143. Id. at 20-15.
144. Id. at 20-13. Interestingly, LCRA initially grounded the gates it placed
on Morriss’ in-laws’ property but not his in-laws’ existing gates, suggesting the
utility valued protecting its employees from electric shock but was not
concerned about the servient estate owner, its employees, or livestock. Only
after this point came up during the commissioner’s hearing did LCRA ground
the property owner’s gates.
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produces magnetic fields, which may or may not have long-term
health effects, but are controversial,145 and are likely to reduce
property values by reducing the number of buyers interested in a
property.
Where the terms of any easement are not clearly delineated in
the documents creating it (or where one party seeks to press its
advantage despite clear terms), there may be important conflicts
between the easement owner and the servient estate owner. This is
because the existence of the easement requires a balancing of
competing interests as “[t]he scope of any easement finds an outer
limit in the privilege of the servient owner to make such uses of the
servient parcel as are not incompatible with the use authorized by
the easement.”146 Or, as one court put it, “[o]f necessity, the
interests of the owner of the easement often conflict with the
interest of the owner of the burdened estate. By law, however, each
of the parties owes certain duties to the other.”147
Courts have dealt with these conflicts on a regular basis. For
example, a Kentucky court found that an easement permitting use
of the servient estate “for the removal over and through said land,
(of) the products taken out of any other land owned or hereafter
acquired” by the easement holder did not include the right to
process coal and dump refuse on the servient estate.148 The court
noted, “While dumping refuse may be an integral part of the
mining operation on a particular tract, it is not an authorized
incident of removing coal from other tracts.”149
145. Id. at 20-8 (“The health effect of magnetic field remains a controversial
topic in spite of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report that
concluded that the low frequency, low level electric, and magnetic fields are not
producing any health risks. Many people believe that the prudent approach is
‘prudent avoidance’ to long-term exposure.”); Peter Dent & Sally Sims,
Introduction, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON
PROPERTY VALUE 1, 3 (Sally Bond, Sally Sims, & Peter Dent, eds. 2013) (“One
important aspect in considering the impact of HVOTLs, cell towers and wind
turbines on individual property values is the level of risk that an individual
perceives as existing in a set of circumstances.”); Dent & Sims, Risk Perception,
in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY
VALUE 27, 37 (“If factors such as health, aesthetics and nuisance are considered
to cause property stigma in specific cases, and these factors are considered to
have an impact on the value of a property, then this needs to be incorporated into
a valuer’s toolkit and quantified.”). In addition, some studies have shown that
voluntariness of exposure influences acceptance of risk. Id. at 32.
146. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.14, at 34-156.
147. Center Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. City of Derby, 352 A.2d 304, 307
(Conn. 1974).
148. Hi Hat Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Newman, 352 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1961).
149. Id.
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Similarly, where an easement permitted an adjacent landowner
to maintain a drainage ditch across the servient estate, the
California Supreme Court held that this did not require the servient
estate owner to incur the expense of fencing off or covering the
ditch to prevent cattle grazing on his land from damaging the
banks, finding that:
[I]f the plaintiff’s theory be correct, the defendant cannot
use his land as a pasture, though that may be the best and
perhaps only profitable use he can make of it, unless he
employs men to patrol the ditch and keep the cattle away
from it, or goes to the expense of fencing it in or covering it
with bridges. It does not seem to us that the plaintiff’s
easement on the land can impose any such burden as that
on the defendant.150
In another case, where the easement owner damaged the
underlying estate, the courts took a similar approach. Where the
owner of a pipeline easement removed a portion of a flood control
dike during construction of its pipeline and did not replace it when
construction was completed, the court held that the easement
owner was liable for the cost of the repair.151 More generally, the
courts have concluded that where easements fail to be clear about
the responsibility for maintenance and repair costs necessary “for
the full enjoyment of the easement,” then “the dominant owner is
normally considered to have a duty to make such repairs as are
necessary to permit the servient owner to have reasonable use of
his or her tenement, and to have the privilege of making such
repairs as are necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the
easement was created.”152
Courts have drawn from these cases the general principle that
“[t]he owner of an easement has all rights incident or necessary to
its proper enjoyment, but nothing more.”153 At the same time,
“[t]he owner of the servient estate may not use the property subject
to the easement in a way that would lead to a material increase in
the cost or inconvenience to the easement holder’s exercise of his
rights.”154 Applying these principles in a LIE case involving
transmission lines, where the utility sought to block construction of

150. Durfee v. Garvey, 21 P. 302, 303 (Cal. 1889).
151. Ctr. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 352 A.2d at 309.
152. 4 POWELL, supra note 8 § 34.12, at 34-146 to 34-147.
153. Ctr. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 352 A.2d at 307.
154. Texon, Inc. v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 394 N.E.2d 976, 978 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1979).
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a parking lot beneath the line, the court held a reasonableness
standard applied to balancing the rights of the two parties.155
Because there are often design issues with respect to many
LIEs that impact the servient estate, this reasonableness standard
will prove critical in resolving conflicts likely to arise between
utilities and servient estate owners. However, these issues would
be better dealt with through negotiations in creating the easement,
which the current structure of eminent domain law precludes. For
example, high voltage lines can produce an unpleasant audible
noise.156 This noise can be minimized during design, generally by
increasing conductor size and/or the “air-gap spacing.”157 Both
measures increase the utility’s costs. Similarly, design of a high
voltage line influences the types of inspection and maintenance
activities necessary to maintain it,158 and improper design can
cause problems as lines sag and elongate due to weather and
loading. Preventing these problems requires technical knowledge
landowners are unlikely to possess,159 and suggests that the burden
of avoiding these problems is efficiently placed on the utility.
Further, a check on utility-drafted LIE documents is needed
because utilities often do a poor job of drafting the easement terms.
For example, Oncor included in its easement (imposed via eminent
domain) a requirement that landowners comply with all applicable
laws before installing streets, water lines, sewer lines, telephone

155. W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Sambo’s of Mass., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 729, 735
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
156. Karady, Environmental Impact, supra note 58, at 20-14. Karady states
that the audible noise “produced in fair weather conditions is negligible,”
although the authors have observed audible noise under fair weather conditions.
Id.
157. BLUME, supra note 14, at 57.
158. See Joe C. Pohlman, Transmission Line Structures, in ELECTRIC POWER
GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 10-1, 10-4 to 10-5 (Leonard L.
Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012); Green et al., supra note 56, at 12-10 to 12-14
(describing maintenance procedures).
159. See Dale A. Douglass & E. Ridley Thrash, Sag and Tension of
Conductor, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND
DISTRIBUTION 15-1 (Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“The energized
conductors of transmission and distribution lines must be placed to totally
eliminate the possibility of injury to people. Overhead conductors, however,
elongate with time, temperature, and tension, thereby changing their original
position after installation. Despite the effects of weather and loading on a line,
the conductors must remain at safe distances from buildings, objects, and people
or vehicles passing beneath the line at all times. To ensure this safety, the shape
of the terrain along the right-of-way, the height and lateral position of the
conductor support points, and the position of the conductor between support
points under all wind, ice, and temperature conditions must be known.”).
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cables, “etc.” within the easement.160 Checking “all applicable laws”
is an absurd responsibility for a utility experienced in operating
transmission lines to impose on a landowner. Similarly, Oncor’s
easement required that landowners not make any change in grade,
elevation or contour of the land without written permission from the
utility, specifically prohibiting terraces, road work, drainage ditches,
excavations, or “soil disturbing activities.”161 Exempted were
“normal agricultural activities,” a term left undefined in the
easement.162 Notably, the easement included no provision requiring
Oncor to respond within a reasonable time or specified time to a
request from the landowner.163 Landowners need a mechanism by
which they can request courts to adjust the terms of easements at the
time of the taking to clarify the rights and obligations of the parties.
This will not only facilitate proper valuation of the interest taken but
will also reduce future transaction costs. These are primarily
examples of shoddy draftsmanship, but the existence of such poor
quality lawyering in critical documents is itself an illustration of the
incentive problems created by failing to provide a check on the
unilateral imposition of terms. Allowing a utility to unilaterally
impose poorly drafted terms needlessly increases future transaction
costs and complicates the valuation exercise.
Finally, many conflicts among landowners in a community are
resolved informally, without the need for litigation.164 Utility LIE
owners lack the incentives necessary to make such informal
resolutions work, and also have the resources to out-lawyer
individual landowners with the threat of costly litigation.
2. Modification
Power and communications technologies change over time, as
do population patterns and needs. Anticipating change in these
industries suggests that LIEs should be limited to specific periods
to allow renegotiation in the future when more is known about
future needs. Long-lived LIEs are more problematic than many
other easements. Barring the development of personal jetpacks or
Star Trek-style transporters, landlocked parcels will require access
to transportation networks. However, the same is not true of
utilities and LIEs. For example, 30 years ago, the Lower Colorado
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra app. 3.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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River Authority (LCRA) was heavily invested in developing
lignite coal resources in the Austin, Texas area, enraging
environmental activists.165 Today, the LCRA is investing heavily
in wind power in the Texas panhandle, delighting the
environmental activists and upsetting rural landowners along the
transmission corridor.166 In addition, one LIE attracts another.
Once a utility easement crosses a property, other utilities seek to
make use of the easement as well, and they argue that a second
easement’s damage to property values is minimal. In Texas, the
Public Utilities Commission encourages new LIEs to parallel
existing ones. Providing a means for the modification of LIEs to
cope with changes in technology and population patterns as well as
the potential for additional LIEs is thus important. Courts will need
to be able to cope with changes in LIEs over time. Of course,
better drafting in the creation of the LIE would reduce the number
of instances in which a court would be called on, but the need for
some modifications in light of changed circumstances is virtually
certain to occur no matter how carefully the initial easement is
drafted.
One example that suggests how courts might approach
modifications to LIEs as circumstances change comes from a
Kentucky transmission line case. In that case, the servient estate
owner graded the land under the lines, raising the ground level by
seven feet, and the utility sought to recover the cost of raising the
lines.167 The court began its analysis by noting that:
[F]rom the very nature of an electrical transmission line
and its occupancy of air space rather than surface area, the
scope of the easement is somewhat fluid. Neither the rights
165. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED CAMP SWIFT LIGNITE
LEASING, BASTROP COUNTY, TEXAS 1-1 (1st ed. 1980); BILL OLIVER, NOT SO
FAST, L.C.R.A (Live Oak Records 1982).
166. See American Council on Renewable Energy, Renewable Energy in
Texas (Jan. 2014), http://www.acore.org/files/pdfs/states/Texas.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/6Q2E-54HU (summarizing the state’s efforts to boost
renewables: Texas leads the nation in wind power generation, with more than
twice the installed capacity as the next closest state. In addition, Texas has more
biodiesel capacity than any other state in the nation.); Bill Peacock, Texas Wind
Power: New Record, Bad Economics (and capacity inhibitor for future
reliability) (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.masterresource.org/texas/setting-therecord-straight-on-renewable-energy-subsidies/, archived at http://perma.cc
/99Y-BBFG (describing Texas’ renewable energy programs); Sam Pakan, The
Great Texas Wind Hoax: Property Owners vs. the State (Part 1), PATRIOT
UPDATE (Apr. 8, 2011), http://patriotupdate.com/articles/the-great-texas-windswindle-property-owners-vs-the-state-part-i/, archived at http://perma.cc/T39U2SY3 (describing landowner objections to transmission lines).
167. Westphal v. Ky. Utilities. Co., 343 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1961).
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of the Company nor of the defendants are absolute, but
each must be defined in terms of the rights of the other. Our
ultimate criterion is therefore the reasonableness of use by
each party.168
In assessing reasonableness, the court looked to “present day
conditions” both with respect to the utility’s use and the servient
estate owner’s use. Making that assessment, the court concluded
that:
[T]he increased use of the automobile and the construction
of an important highway adjacent to defendants’ property
may be considered normal developments in our dynamic
society which have made appropriate the proper and
reasonable use of the surface for the passage of vehicular
traffic. In order to utilize the surface for this change in use,
defendants [landowners] find it necessary to level their
property and thereby raise the surface of their land a
relatively insignificant height. It is true they have invaded 7
feet of air space which the Company claims the right to
appropriate. However, assuming the rights of the parties do
conflict (which is not clear in this record), we are of the
opinion that defendants now have a better right to utilize
this air space as appurtenant to a proper use of their land
than plaintiff has to appropriate it exclusively as a cushion
against a highly speculative hazard.169
One way to reduce the need for court intervention is to provide
for binding arbitration by neutral third parties where either party to
the LIE seeks to change the use. A second method of reducing
such conflicts is to limit the LIEs to a specific time period,
reducing the chance that technological change will require altering
the terms.
Finally, utilities often claim the right to assign their rights
under a LIE. For example, most utilities claim the right to transfer
their easement rights to any other person or legal entity without the
necessity of consent, permission, or even notice to the landowner.
This leaves the landowner with no control over the identity of the
entity with which the landowners is sharing the land. It is
uncommon for landowners to lease land and allow the lessee an
unlimited right to assign the lease without the landowner’s
168. Id. at 370.
169. Id. at 371. Analogously “ “, courts have held that oil and gas leases are
made contemplating existing technology, and so “the lessee is responsible for
damages to the land ruined by his use of new drilling methods.” 1A THOMPSON,
supra note 8, §170 at 104.
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approval. In particular, this raises the spectre that the utility might
assign its rights to a judgment proof entity, leaving the landowner
unprotected. A negotiated solution, which might provide
landowners with an option to reject transfers under a financial
responsibility standard, notice of proposed transfers, or other
accommodations, would address such concerns. Where courts are
overseeing LIE creations, they should have the power to add such
terms. Restricting utilities’ eminent domain powers would also
force the issue into negotiations.
3. Termination
Easements may be created as perpetual or for limited periods of
time, including either a fixed period or “subject to conditions
which provide for its termination upon the happening of certain
contingencies.”170 When utilities use eminent domain to take
perpetual easements, as they generally do, they are taking the
maximum durational interest they can. Since the burden on the
servient tenement increases with duration, a more appropriate
duration may often be less than infinite. Particularly where
technological and demographic change is likely to affect the future
usefulness of an easement, an infinitely lived easement precludes
the parties bargaining over how to adapt to new circumstances.
Because courts are an inferior substitute (albeit one that is superior
to no outside review at all) to arm’s length bargaining, encouraging
the parties to negotiate is superior to having terms set by outsiders.
In the case of lines designed to serve wind farms with a useful life
of approximately 20 years, permanent easements seem particularly
inappropriate and unlikely to be the result of arm’s length
bargaining.
Perpetual easements are particularly problematic in the LIE
context because there are few remedies available to landowners
seeking to end a dysfunctional relationship involving an easement.
170. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.87 at 298. See also
4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.18 at 34-176 to 34-177 (“An easement can
terminate either by expiring in accordance with the intent of the parties
manifested in the creating transaction, or by being extinguished by the course of
events subsequent to its creation. Termination by extinguishment includes a
wide variety of methods, some resting primarily upon conduct of the dominant
owner, as for example, release and abandonment; some resting primarily upon
conduct of the servient owner, as for example, prescription and conveyance to a
third person having no actual or constructive notice of the easement’s existence;
some resting upon conduct in which both parties must participate, as for
example, merger, and estoppel; and some resting upon the conduct of outside
entities, as for example, mortgage foreclosures, eminent domain and tax sales.”).
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The relationship created by an eminent domain LIE, whose terms
are dictated by a utility, includes neither exit nor voice. Where
there is a lack of responsiveness by an organization to exit and
voice, Hirschman argues that “thought must be given both to
making exit more easy and attractive by appropriately redesigned
institutions and to making the organization more responsive to
voice.”171 To do that in the utility LIE case requires giving servient
estate owners both exit rights and a means of exercising voice
during the easement’s existence.
In general, easements may be terminated by action of the
dominant owner (e.g., release and abandonment), through
prescription, merger, estoppel, eminent domain, mortgage
foreclosures, or tax sales.172 Crucially, there is no general method
for the servient owner to escape the easement analogous to a
cotenant’s ability to force a partition or sale. The only method by
which servient estate owners have escaped easements in the courts is
through the “liberal application of the estoppel doctrine.” As
Powell’s treatise notes, this is an unusual application of the concept
of estoppel:
In most branches of the law an estoppel arises only through
reliance upon a misrepresentation of a present or past factual
situation. The persons estopped must have caused, in such a
way that they are responsible for having done so, the persons
claiming the benefit of an estoppel to believe something to
be true that is not true. In the extinguishment of easements,
however, the required basic misrepresentation is really as to
the future, instead of as to the past or present. It consists in
the creation of a reasonable believe that in the future the
dominant owner intends not to make use of the servient
tenement authorized by the easement. As phrased, this
misrepresentation concerns a present intent as to future
conduct. Thus verbally, this case is brought within the
theoretical scope of estoppel, but such conformity is more
verbal than real.173
Given the extremely limited circumstances in which a court might
be willing to stretch estoppel to fit such circumstances, there is
effectively almost no remedy for the servient estate owner
available at law.

171. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6, at 123.
172. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.18 at 34-176 to 34-177.
173. Id. at § 34.22[2], 34-206 to 34-207.
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III. SOLVING JOINT OWNERSHIP ISSUES IN LIES
We propose five statutory reforms to eminent domain law by
which states could address the problems identified with LIEs. The
simplest is to end the eminent domain powers of utilities and
require them to negotiate terms for easements with landowners.
While we recognize there may be occasional hold out issues, the
existence of multiple routes for most utility infrastructure suggests
to us that this is unlikely to be a major problem for expanding and
improving the United States’ energy and telecommunications
infrastructure. Short of ending utility eminent domain powers, we
suggest four other reforms designed to cope with the problems a
unilateral power to control easement terms creates.
A. Limit eminent domain powers of utilities
The simplest solution to the problems described above is to
remove the power of eminent domain from utilities for LIEs.
Utilities argue that they need eminent domain power to avoid hold
out problems.174 However, the successful record of utility
acquisition of LIEs without the use of eminent domain suggests
this is overstated. For example, the LCRA line, which crosses
Kimble County, Texas en route from the Texas Panhandle to
Austin, is the second such line to be constructed on that route.175
The first was built roughly 20 miles to the east by Florida Power &
174. The grant of eminent domain powers to electric utilities traces in part to
famed early twentieth century utility executive Samuel Insull, who
[W]as one of the few business leaders to join Robert LaFollette and other
progressive politicians to oppose municipal corruption, to advance
“scientific” approaches for managing government and business, and to
argue that electricity companies constituted natural monopolies that
required public oversight. . . . Insull’s less vocalized motivation was a
desire to deal with only one state agency rather than hundreds of city
councils with whom his expanding empire was doing business. . . .
Although criticized by many of his utility colleagues who wanted no
government intervention, Insull became the chief proponent of regulation
and monopoly. He understood that public oversight meant utilities would
gain protection from competitors as well as the right of eminent domain,
which previously was reserved for the state.
MUNSON, supra note 10, at 55. The transformation of utilities from “a
hodgepodge of competitive businesses into centralized utility monopolies”
helped turn the industry into one dominated by “holding companies and power
pools” which “demanded an increasingly sophisticated and costly transmission
system” which required more investment in equipment during the 1920s than
“the transcontinental railroads during the decade of their most rapid expansion.”
Id. at 56–57.
175. See infra app. 5.
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Light (FPL), which does not have the power of eminent domain in
Texas.176 FPL reportedly paid much higher prices for its easements
than LCRA (although the exact amounts are protected by contracts
prohibiting the landowners from revealing what they were paid). In
addition, FPL easements contain significantly different provisions
from the LCRA easements. For example, FPL indemnified its
servient estate owners.177
There is some evidence that the process by which risks are
imposed affects risk perception, which also suggests that eminent
domain is particularly inappropriate for LIEs, as determining
reasonable compensation is particularly difficult in such
instances.178 As Dent and Sims conclude in their study of risk
perception involved in wind energy and cell phone towers:
Professionals working in the field of value impacts of
facilities such as HVOTLs [high voltage overhead
transmission lines], cell towers and wind turbines need to
appreciate that those opposing any particular technologies,
or specific sites, are not necessarily acting irrationally. Nor
can their actions be categorized simply as NIMBYism (not
in my back yard). . . . There are often more complex issues
surrounding such opposition, such as power relations,
democracy, personal histories, etc.179
Most importantly, terminating utilities’ eminent domain
powers would not end the creation of LIEs, but instead would
require negotiations with landowners for easements. If particular
features of LIEs led to landowners insisting on greater
compensation, utilities would be incentivized to develop means of
abating the problems. If negotiations resulted in higher costs for
utilities, this would lead to more accurate social cost pricing of
transmission—a feature, not a bug. Indeed, forcing utilities to pay
the full cost of building transmission lines would create incentives
to adopt innovative technologies and pricing formulas that could

176. See infra app. 4.
177. See id.
178. For example, some Japanese research has found that “a new social
system involving active participation and ‘ownership’ within the decisionmaking process can change the risk-benefit distribution balance and the role of
all in the community through a more inclusive approach and greater
transparency in risk communication.” Dent & Sims, Risk Perception, supra note
145, at 34–35. This suggests that eminent domain is particularly inappropriate
for such facilities.
179. Id. at 40.
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reduce the need for additional transmission lines.180 As Munson
notes generally:
The fact that more efficient technologies are available or just
on the horizon does not mean they will be adopted, or that
continued technological development will be a priority of a
restructured electricity industry. Whether power innovations
are boosted depends a great deal on how policy barriers are
removed and open markets are advanced.181
Nonetheless, we recognize that utilities are politically powerful
and unlikely to quietly yield a valuable power to redistribute rights
in their favor.182 We therefore also suggest alternative means of
making the eminent domain process more likely to yield improved
LIEs.
B. Empowering neutral decision makers to structure easements
As discussed above, a key difference between LIEs and other
easements is the absence of either arm’s length bargaining over the
easement terms, or a neutral third party to craft the easement.
Eminent domain proceedings in all states include neutral third
parties to determine the price. For example, Texas law provides for
an initial commissioners’ hearing using a panel of three area
residents appointed by the local district judge, followed by appeal
to the district court.183 A small change to most states’ statutes
would be sufficient to enable these same neutral decisionmakers to
have the power to alter the easement terms proposed by the utility
for the LIE.184 Not only would this provide a useful check on
180. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 149 (noting potential for improved
conductors that can carry more power than existing materials); Id. at 150 (noting
potential for congestion charges to improve efficiency of networks). Innovation
is a problem in electric utilities because as a group they spend relatively little on
research and development, devoting just 0.03% of revenue to R&D. Id. at 152.
See also NYE, supra note 15, at 159 (noting lack of investment in R&D and
advanced transmission line technology).
181. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 152.
182. Utilities are aided by environmentalists’ “myopic focus on Renewable
Portfolio Standards”, which helps create a ‘bootleggers and Baptists’ coalition in
favor of expansion of transmission lines. Id. at 164; Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers
and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REGULATION 12
(May/June 1983). “Soft” energy gurus, Amory and Hunter Lovins, have long
advocated for greater reliance on dispersed generation systems but the overall
response has been greater centralization. NYE, supra note 15, at 132.
183. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (2013).
184. Asking a neutral third party to make such decisions may require
additional skills beyond valuation, but we think courts and the sorts of lay panels
often asked to play a role in such disputes (as in Texas) are capable of
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potential abuse of the eminent domain process, but it would also
enable the eminent domain proceeding to better cope with hard-tovalue characteristics of easements, such as indemnification clauses.
Moreover, this would likely induce more bargaining by utilities
prior to the contest stage, as they would bargain in the shadow of
the law.
For example, the Texas eminent domain statute could be
amended by adding a provision to Property Code § 21.042 that
stated: “(h) In addition to awarding damages, the special
commissioners may alter the terms of the easement proposed by
the condemnor,” and amending the initial clause of Property Code
§ 21.003 to provide: “A district court may determine all issues,
including the authority to condemn property, the assessment of
damages, and the terms of any easement or other interest
condemned, in any suit . . .”
Such small changes could provide an important substitute for
the lack of arm’s length bargaining.
C. Create exit rights
Utilities should not be able to take perpetual easements. The
useful life of the infrastructure installed on LIEs is predictable. If
utilities are allowed to retain eminent domain rights, they should
be limited to taking easements no longer than either the current
industry standard for the useful life of the infrastructure to be
installed, or twenty years, whichever is shorter.185 And, of course,
the default rule should be that a utility would be obliged to remove
any structures it had placed on the easement. While this is less than
the unilateral right of exit allowed co-owners of property, it
recognizes that infrastructure investments are lumpy and the
utilities must be able to recover their fixed costs if they are to be
viable. Of course, utilities and landowners should be free to
negotiate for longer easements if they can reach an agreement on
the term, but the power of eminent domain should be limited in
recognition of the extraordinary burdens being forced into an
involuntary relationship with a utility carry for the landowners.

determining the terms of easements as well as the value of interests taken. The
parties would be able to propose language to the decision maker(s) as well.
185. If the length of the easement depended on the utility’s declaration of the
useful life of its equipment, we suspect the claimed useful life of equipment
would improve dramatically. Thus, we suggest that a maximum life be included
to prevent the utility from overinvesting in (or claiming) extending equipment’s
life span to procure longer easements.
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D. Create better data on LIE costs and provisions
One problem for landowners is that they compete on unequal
ground with utilities seeking to create LIEs. The utilities have the
benefit of knowing what they paid for easements elsewhere; the
landowners have only the information their appraisers and
attorneys are able to gather from public records and other sources.
Utilities not only do not share this information with each other or
landowners, but they do not always use it themselves. For
example, a LCRA representative stated in a commissioners’
hearing involving Morriss’s in-laws that “there was no budget” for
land acquisition for a transmission line it was constructing,
implying the utility could spend as much as it wished. Developing
a database of LIE terms and prices would enable appraisers to
provide decision makers and the parties to eminent domain
proceedings with better estimates of the impact of LIEs.
If states are going to allow utilities to exercise eminent domain
powers, they ought to seek to ensure that landowners receive a fair
market price for the easements. Creating a statewide, publicly
available database of LIE terms and prices would be a significant
step in this direction and aid appraisers, fact finders, property
owners, and utilities in properly costing out proposed LIEs.
E. Establish standards to guide determination of value
There are significant and complex issues involved in valuing
the effect of a LIE on a property. One is how to assess the negative
impact on a property’s remainder. A variety of methods have been
used, including surveys and hedonic pricing studies based on
actual sales.186 While hedonic pricing has significant advantages
because it relies on revealed preference data, the optimal approach
involves multiple methods to “triangulate” the real effect.187
Effects can go beyond price issues as well. Some United States and
United Kingdom studies showed reluctance by banks to lend for
properties located near or under high voltage transmission lines;188
there is a lack of studies on whether there are longer times to sale
for properties near or burdened with LIEs.189
186. Dent & Sims, Introduction, supra note 145, at 5–6.
187. David Wyman, et al., Methods, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND
TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY VALUE 11, 21–22 (Sally Bond et
al., eds. 2013).
188. Dent & Sims, Risk Perception, supra note 145, at 36–37.
189. David Wyman & Elaine Worzala, A Review of HVOTL Studies in North
America, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY
VALUE 101, 111 (Sally Bond et al., eds. 2013).
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Another such issue is the impact of public perception of the
health impacts or other dangers of the LIE. There is a large and
contested literature on most LIE uses, from cell phone
infrastructure to power lines.190 Whether these dangers actually
exist is irrelevant, however, if they have an impact on the market
price of the burdened land.191
Current practice leaves these decisions to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis. Developing a framework for compensable
impacts and guidelines could be done by state public utility
commissions through the regulatory process or by other bodies,
including legislatures. Of course, these are open to regulatory
capture by utilities, but most states have law firms that regularly
represent landowners in eminent domain and negotiations over
LIEs, so there would be a repeat player counterweight to utilities.
CONCLUSION
Over time, the size, scope, and number of LIEs are likely to
expand significantly to meet the demand for incorporating
renewable energy and unconventional sources of fossil fuels into
the United States’ national energy networks, as well as to meet the
demand for greater telecommunications bandwidth. In addition,
hardening networks against natural disasters and terrorists require
network expansions that will require LIEs. If we do not wish to
disproportionately burden those landowners on whose properties
the LIEs will be located, we need to improve the process by which
LIEs are created.
The most important reform is to push more LIEs into
negotiations. The unilateral creation of LIEs on all dimensions
other than compensation is problematic in many ways. Since LIEs
rarely involve exit rights, non-negotiated LIEs place landowners
into an often adversarial relationship with a new co-owner of their
land. Absent negotiation, giving courts and other bodies the power
to set easement terms during contested LIE creations would at least
190. SANDY BOND ET AL., TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES
(Sally Bond, Sally Sims, & Peter Dent, eds. 2013); MUNSON, supra note 10, at
176 (“Proposals for high-voltage wires often provoke heated reactions from
homeowners worried about falling property values and illnesses caused by
electromagnetism.”).
191. Peter Dent & Sally Sims, Risk Perception, Stigma, and Behavior, in
TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY VALUE
27, 37 (Sally Bond et al., eds. 2013) (“If factors such as health, aesthetics and
nuisance are considered to cause property stigma in specific cases, and these
factors are considered to have an impact on the value of the property, then this
needs to be incorporated into a valuer’s toolkit and quantified.”).
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partially address these problems. Other steps, as outlined above,
that better inform landowners, courts, and other decision makers
about the impacts of LIEs and the prices set in both voluntary and
involuntary LIE creations would also improve the eminent domain
process.
APPENDIX 1-TYPICAL INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE USED IN
ARM’S LENGTH AGREEMENTS
Grantee hereby agrees to defend, indemnify and hold grantor
and its agents, successors and assigns harmless from and against,
and to reimburse, grantor and its agents, successors and assigns
with respect to any and all liabilities, claims, demands, damages,
expenses or causes of action of whatever nature, specifically
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
of suit paid or incurred by Grantor, its agents, successors and
assigns, asserted by others and related, directly or indirectly, to
Grantee’s use of the easement property, construction or operation
of the pipeline; breach of this agreement, and/or that are caused by
or arise in any manner out of acts or omissions of Grantee, its
agents, employees, representatives or any other person under
Grantee’s control or acting at Grantee’s direction. The terms of this
indemnity provision as it applies to environmental matters shall
survive the termination or expiration of the easements.
APPENDIX 2-TYPICAL INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE USED IN
ARM’S LENGTH AGREEMENTS
Abandonment. If Grantee discontinues to use the Transmission
Facilities for a period greater than one (1) uninterrupted year, after
receiving a written request from Grantor, Grantee shall remove all
of the Transmission Facilities on the Land and restore the Land to
its approximate original condition that existed before Grantee
constructed its Transmission Facilities all at Grantee’s sole cost
and expense. Such removal by Grantee shall be accomplished
within one (1) year after receiving a written request from Grantor
and include any Transmission Facilities to a depth of one (1) foot
beneath the surface of the Land.
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APPENDIX 3 - ONCOR EASEMENT (TAKEN WITH EMINENT
DOMAIN)
EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY
STATE OF TEXAS
§
§ KNOW ALL MEN
BY THESE PRESENTS:
COUNTY OF LAMPASAS
§
That, EVAN GEORGE EVANS and BONNIE KIM EVANS,
HUSBAND AND WIFE, hereinafter called “Grantors”, whether
one or more, for and in consideration of Ten and no/100 Dollars
($10.00) and other valuable consideration to Grantor In hand paid
by Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC, a Delaware limited
Liability company, 1601 Bryan St., Dallas, Texas 76201,
hereinafter referred to as “Grantee”, has granted, sold and
conveyed and by these presents does grant, sell and convey unto
said Grantee, its successors and assigns, an easement and right-ofway for one double circuit electric transmission power line
consisting of a variable number of wires and cables, including
communication wires to be used solely In connection with the
transmission of electricity, together with all necessary or desirable
appurtenances Including supporting structures, foundations, guy
wires and guy anchorages (the “Facilities”) over, under, across and
upon all that certain tracts) of land located in Lampasas County,
Texas, more particularly described in Exhibits A and B, attached
hereto and made part hereof.
Together with: (1) the right of Ingress and egress over and
along the easement and right-of-way and over Grantor’s adjacent
lands to or from the easement and right-of-way, for the purpose of
and with the right to construct, operate, improve, reconstruct,
replace, repair, inspect, patrol, maintain and add or remove such
electric power and communications lines or other Facilities as the
Grantee may from time to time find necessary, convenient or
desirable to erect thereon during the initial construction of the
Facilities or at any time thereafter; (2) the right to Install gates In
all existing and future fences crossing the easement and right-ofway, provided such gates will be Installed in a manner that will not
weaken such fences; (3) the right to relocate its facilities along the
same general direction of said lines; (4) the right to trim and cut
down trees and shrubbery on the easement and right-of-way,
including by use of herbicides or other similar chemicals approved
by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, to the extent, In the
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sole judgment of the Grantee, necessary to prevent possible
interference with the operation of said lines or to remove possible
hazard thereto; and (5) the right to remove at Grantor’s expense or
to prevent the construction on the easement and right-of-way of
any or all buildings, structures and obstructions.
Grantor shell not make or cause any changes In grade,
elevation, or contour of the land (except those activities, excluding
terracing, associated with normal agricultural activities) within the
easement and right-of-way described herein without first providing
advance notice and obtaining prior written consent to do so from
Grantee. If written consent Is not obtained prior to any action by
Grantor that causes any changes In grade, elevation, or contour of
the land within the easement and right-of-way, Grantor shall, upon
demand from Grantee, at Grantor’s expanse, restore the easement
and right-of-way to Its previously existing condition, or reimburse
Grantee fully for the cost of adjusting its Facilities as necessary to
accommodate the change In grade, elevation, or contour of the land
within the easement and right-of-way In the event Grantor falls to
promptly restore the grade, elevation, or contour to its previously
existing condition.
Grantor shall not perform any excavations, trenching, or other
soil disturbing activities (except those activities, excluding
terracing, associated with normal agricultural activities) that, in the
sole judgment of Grantee, will endanger the integrity of the
supporting structures and/or foundations or other Facilities, as
applicable, or perform any other activities that may, in the sole
judgment of Grantee, remove, reduce, or adversely affect or Impact
the lateral support of the supporting structures and/or foundations
or other Facilities, as applicable, without first providing advance
notice and obtaining prior written consent to do so from Grantee. If
prior written consent Is not obtained by Grantor prior to
performing any excavation, trenching or other soil disturbing
activity that endangers the integrity of the supporting structures or
foundations or other Facilities, as applicable, Grantor shall, upon
demand from Grantee, at Grantor’s expense, restore the easement
and right-of-way to Its previously existing condition, or reimburse
Grantee fully for the cost of adjusting its Facilities as necessary to
accommodate the excavation, trenching, or soil disturbing activity
in the event Grantor falls to promptly restore the easement and
right-of way to Us previously existing condition or cannot do so.
Grantor reserves the right to use the easement and right of way
area provided such use shall not Include the growing of trees
thereon or any other use that might, in the sole judgment of the
Grantee, interfere with the exercise by the Grantee of the rights
hereby granted. Grantor further reserves the right to lay out,
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dedicate, construct, maintain and use across said strip such roads,
streets, alleys, railroad tracks, underground telephone cables and
conduits and gas, water and sewer pipelines as will not interfere
with Grantee’s use of said land for the purpose aforesaid, provided
ail such facilities shall be located at angles of not less than 46
degrees to any of Grantee’s (Ines, and shall be so constructed as to
provide with respect to Grantee’s Facilities the minimum
clearances provided by law and recognized as standard in the
electrical Industry, as same may change from time to time. Grantor
also reserves the right to erect fences not more than 8 feet high
across said land, provided all such fences shall have gates,
openings, or removable sections at least 16 feet wide which will
permit Grantee reasonable access to all parts of said land. Should
Grantee later determine that a width greater than 16 feet is
necessary, then Grantee shall have the right granted above to
Install additional or wider gates at Its sole discretion, but the
installation of such additional or wider gates shall be at the sola
expense of Grantee.
Grantor retains all right, title, and interest in and to all oil, gas,
and other minerals (whether by law classified as part of the mineral
estate or the surface estate) and groundwater In, on, and under the
strip or land described herein; provided, however, that Grantor
shall not be permitted to drill for oil, gas, and other minerals, and
groundwater from and under said strip of land but Grantor may
extract oil, gas, and other minerals, and groundwater from and
under said strip of land by directional drilling, mining, or other
means, so long as Grantee’s use of said strip is not disturbed,
which use shall include the right of Grantee to physical and/or
lateral support for the Facilities, as well as the right that the
Facilities shall not be endangered, obstructed, or Interfered with by
such operations. In addition to the consideration above recited for
the easement and right-of-way hereby granted, the Grantee will
pay to the owner of the land, and, if leased, to his tenant, as they
may be respectively entitled for actual damages to fences and
growing crops and Improvements located on the easement and
right-of-way caused by reason of the construction, maintenance,
addition or removal of said lines; provided, however, that no such
payment will be made for trimming or removal of trees growing on
the easement and right-of-way, nor for removal of buildings,
structures, or obstructions erected upon the easement and right-ofway after granting of this easement and right-of-way.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described easement and
right-of-way unto the said Grantee, Its successors and assigns, until
all of said lines end other Facilities shall be abandoned, and In that
event said easement and right-of-way shall cease and all rights
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herein granted shall terminate and revert to Grantor or Grantor’s
heirs, successors or assigns; and Grantor hereby binds Grantor and
Grantor’s heirs, successors, assigns, and legal representatives, to
warrant and forever defend the above described easement and
right-of-way unto Grantee, its successors and assigns, against
every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same
or any part thereof. This easement may be assigned in whole or in
part.
APPENDIX 4-FPL EASEMENT (NEGOTIATED WITHOUT EMINENT
DOMAIN)
TRANSMISSION EASEMENT
THIS TRANSMISSION EASEMENT (“Agreement”) is made
and entered into this 31st day of March, 2009 by and among Stacy
Loth, as her sole and separate property, as to an undivided 50%
Interest, and Stephanie A. Iglor, as her sole and separate property,
as to an undivided 50% Interest (collectively, the “Grantor”), and
Horse Hollow Generation Tic, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company (“Grantee”), who arc sometimes individually referred to
as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties”.
RECITALS
A. Grantor is the owner of a certain tract of real property
located in Kimble County, Texas and more particularly described
on Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof (“Land”); and
B. Grantor desires to grant and convey to Grantee an exclusive
easement for the erection, installation and maintenance of certain
facilities for the transmission of electric power over and across a
certain portion of the Land.
IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
(1.) Transmission Easement. Grantor grants to Grantee an
irrevocable, exclusive easement for the construction, installation,
maintenance, use, operation, repair, replacement, relocation and
removal of Transmission Facilities and Telecommunication
Facilities on, over, across, along and under the Land or such
portions thereof that may be described in the attached Exhibit A
and depicted in the attached Exhibit B (“Transmission and
Telecommunication Easement”). “Transmission Facilities” shall
mean all improvements whose purpose is to deliver electrical
power to an electrical power grid or other system, Including
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without limitation transformers and overhead and underground
electrical transmission lines, and interconnection facilities.
“Telecommunication Facilities” shall mean all improvements whose
purpose is to provide telecommunication services, including
telephone, closed-circuit television, microwave, internet, computer
data and other telecommunication services related to the operation of
the Transmission Facilities. Grantor shall also grant to Grantee the
right to investigate, inspect, survey, and conduct tests on the Land
relating to the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement,
including, but not limited to, environmental, archeological and
geotechnical tests and studies. This easement is limited to one
hundred twenty-five (125) feet in width, There shall be no more than
one 345 KV electric line and reasonably necessary accessories
structures for said 345 KV line. The poles utilized shall be single
spun concrete poles.
(2.) Access Easement. Grantor grants to Grantee an
irrevocable, non-exclusive easement for vehicular and pedestrian
ingress and egress over, across and along the Land or such portions
thereof that may be described in the attached Exhibit A (“Access
Easement”) by means of any existing roads or lanes thereon, or
otherwise by such route or routes as Grantee or Grantor may
construct from time to time. If Grantee needs to construct a road on
the Land, it shall coordinate the location of the road with Grantor.
Grantee agrees to maintain and repair all roadway improvements
located on the Access Easement for the joint use thereof by
Grantor and Grantee for ingress and egress over, across, and along
the Access Easement; provided, however, Grantor shall reimburse
Grantee for any costs and expenses incurred by Grantee to repair
any damage or perform any special maintenance of the roadway
caused by any person using the roadway with Grantor’s
permission.
(3.) Construction Easement and Guy Easement. Grantor hereby
grants to Grantee, for the benefit of Grantee and its successors and
assigns, a temporary easement on, over, along and under that
portion of the Land located within the four hundred thirty foot
(430*) area as measured from the point of intersection of the center
line of the Transmission and Telecommunication Facilities as
depicted on the attached Exhibit C (“Construction Easement”) (1)
to construct and install guy stub(s), anchors and necessary guy
wires (collectively “Guy Facilities”) to support the Transmission
Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities to be constructed on
the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the
Construction Easement; (2) to store material and equipment during
construction of the Guy Facilities and during construction of the
Transmission Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities; and (3) to
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construct and install the Transmission Facilities and
Telecommunication Facilities to be constructed on the Transmission
and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the Construction
Easement. The Construction Easement shall terminate upon
completion of construction of the Guy Facilities and the Transmission
Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities constructed on the
Transmission and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the
Construction Basement. Grantor hereby grants to Grantee, for the
benefit of Grantee and its successors and assigns, a permanent,
exclusive easement on, over, along and under the Land located within
the one hundred and sixty-five foot (165’) area as measured from the
point of intersection of the center line of the Transmission and
Telecommunication Facilities as depicted on the attached Exhibit C
(“Guy Easement”) to maintain, use, operate, repair, replace,
relocate and remove the Guy Facilities.
(4.) Ownership. Grantor is the holder of fee simple title to all of
the Land, and has the right, without the joinder of any other party,
to enter into this Agreement and grant Grantee lite Easements. As
used herein, the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement
and Access Easement shall collectively be referred to as
“Easements”. Grantor agrees to warrant and defend its ownership
of the Land and Grantee’s interest in this Agreement against any
other party claiming to have any ownership interest in the Land.
(5.) Relocation of Facilities. The exact locations and routes of
the Easements may not be determined until the completion of
Grantee’s inspection, testing, study and surveying of the Land and
the locations and routes of such Basements as shown on the
attached Exhibit B may be relocated or rerouted by Grantee, after
obtaining written consent from Grantor, at any time during the
term of this Agreement, so long as the nature and extent of any
such relocated or rerouted Easements arc not materially different
and impose no greater burden on the Land than the original
locations or routes, and so long as Grantee takes appropriate
actions to minimize any disruption or inconvenience to Grantor
and the uses of the Land reserved to Grantor; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, once the 345 KV line has been constructed, Grantee
shall have no further right to change the location of the easement
without the prior written consent of Grantor, Grantee shall provide
Grantor an “as built” survey of any such relocated or rerouted
Easements after receiving a written request from Grantor.
(6.) Uses Reserved by Grantor. Grantor expressly reserves the
right to use the Land for all other purposes not granted to Grantee
under this Agreement, including oil and gas exploration and
production, ranching and agricultural uses, hunting and other
recreational uses that do not interfere in any way with Grantee’s
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use of the Land under this Agreement, and including the joint use
of the roadways now or hereafter located on the Access Easement,
subject to the following conditions, requirements and limitations:
(i.) Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. Grantor agrees to
provide Grantee with current information concerning the status and
location of all oil and gas exploration and production activities on
the Land. Any new oil and gas leases or renewals of existing oil
and gas leases entered into by Grantor must include a surface use
agreement that will prevent the oil and gas exploration and
production activities from interfering with Grantee’s use of the
Land.
(ii.) Ranching and Agricultural Uses. Grantor and Grantee
agree to cooperate with each other in a manner that will allow
Grantor to continue the current ranching and agricultural uses of
the Land in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with
Grantee’s use of the Land.
* There is included a temporary easement as shown on Exhibit C
until installation of the 345 KV line has been completed and used
in a commercial manner.
(iii.) Hunting and Other Recreational Uses. Grantor and
Grantee agree to cooperate with each other in a manner that will
allow Grantor to use the Land for hunting and other recreational
purposes in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with
Grantee’s use of the Land or impact the safety of its employees or
contractors, provided however, during hunting season, Grantee will
not enter the Land without providing Grantor or Grantor’s attorney
notice, as provided in Section 13 of (his Agreement, of their
intentions to enter the Land.
(7.) No Interference. Grantor covenants and agrees that neither
Grantor nor its agents, lessees, invitees, guests, licensees,
successors or assigns will (i) interfere with, impair or prohibit the
free and complete use and enjoyment by Grantee of its rights
granted by this Agreement; (ii) take any action which will in any
way interfere with or impair the transmission of electric,
electromagnetic or other forms of energy to or from the Land; or
(iii) take any action which will interfere with or impair Grantee’s
access to the Land for the purposes specified in this Agreement.
Grantee shall have the right, without compensation to Grantor, to
cut, prune and remove or otherwise dispose of any foliage or
vegetation on or near the Land that Grantee deems a threat or
potential threat to the Transmission Facilities or its rights
hereunder.
(8.) Right to Mortgage. Grantee may, upon notice to Grantor,
but without Grantor’s consent or approval, mortgage, collaterally
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assign, or otherwise encumber and grant security interests in all or
any part of its interest in the Land. These various security interests
in all or a part of the Land are collectively referred to as a
“Mortgage” and each holder of the Mortgage, is referred to as
“Mortgagee.” Any such Mortgagee shall use the Land only for the
uses permitted under this Agreement. Whenever Grantee has
mortgaged an interest under this Section, it will give notice of the
Mortgage (including the address of the Mortgagee for notice
purposes) to Grantor; provided that failure to give this notice shall
not constitute a default under this Agreement, but rather shall only
have the effect of not binding Grantor with respect to such
Mortgage until notice is given. As a precondition to exercising any
rights or remedies related to any alleged default by Grantee under
this Agreement, Grantor shall give written notice of the default to
each Mortgagee at the same time it delivers notice of default to
Grantee, specifying in detail the alleged event of default and the
required remedy. To the extent permitted by the Mortgage at issue,
any Mortgagee shall be permitted to exercise or perform any and
all of Grantee’s rights and obligations hereunder and Grantor shall
accept such exercise and performance thereby. Any Mortgagee
under any Mortgage shall be entitled to assign its interest or
enforce its rights thereunder, as permitted by applicable law,
without notice to or approval of Grantor.
(9.) Assignment and Sublease. Grantee shall have the right,
without Grantor’s consent, to sell, convey, lease, or assign all or
any portion of its interest in the Land, on either an exclusive or a
non-exclusive basis, or to grant subleases, subcasements, coeasements, separate leases, easements, licenses or similar rights
with respect to the Land (collectively, “Assignment”), to one or
more persons or entities (collectively “Assignee”). Any such
Assignee shall use the Land only for the uses permitted under this
Agreement. When Grantee has assigned its interests under this
Section, or has conveyed a sublease, subeasement or other interest,
Grantee shall give notice of the assignment or conveyance
(including the address of the Assignee for notice purposes) to
Grantor; provided the failure to give such notice shall not
constitute a default under this Agreement, but rather shall only
have the effect of not binding Grantor with respect to such
assignment or conveyance until such notice is given. Any such
assignment by Grantee of its interests in this Agreement shall
release Grantee from all obligations accruing after the date that
liability for such obligations is assumed by the Assignee.
(10.) Hazardous Materials. Grantor represents and warrants
that, to the best of Grantor’s knowledge, the Land is not and has
not been in violation of any federal, state or local environmental
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health or safety laws, statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or
requirement (“Environmental Laws”), and Grantor has not received
any notice or other communication from any governmental authorities
alleging that the Land is in violation of any Environmental Laws.
“Hazardous Materials” shall mean any asbestos containing materials,
petroleum, explosives, toxic materials, or substances regulated as
hazardous wastes, hazardous materials, hazardous substances, or toxic
substances under any federal, state, or local law or regulation. Grantor
represents and warrants that, except as disclosed to Grantee in
writing, to the best of Grantor’s knowledge, no underground storage
tanks and no Hazardous Materials are or were located on the Land
during or prior to Grantor’s ownership of the Land. Grantor shall
not violate in a material way any Environmental Law relating to
the Land.
(11.) Indemnity by Grantee. Grantee shall defend, indemnify,
protect and hold Grantor harmless from and against all liabilities,
costs, expenses, obligations, losses, damages, claims, (collectively
“Liability”) resulting from the negligence, willful misconduct, or
breach of this Agreement by Grantee, its agents, contractors or
employees, invitees, licensees and permittees; provided, however,
that such Liability is not due to any negligence, willful misconduct,
or breach by Grantor, its agents, contractors or employees,
invitees, licensees or permittees.
(12.) Removal. If Grantee discontinues to use the Transmission
Facilities for a period greater than one (1) uninterrupted year, after
receiving a written request from Grantor, Grantee shall remove all
of Transmission Facilities on the Land and restore the Land to its
approximate original condition that existed before Grantee
constructed its Transmission Facilities all at Grantee’s sole cost
and expense. Such removal by Grantee shall be accomplished
within one (1) year after receiving a written request from Grantor
and include any Transmission Facilities to a depth of one (1) foot
beneath the surface of the Land.
(13.) Notice. All notices given or permitted to be given
hereunder shall be in writing. Notice is considered given either (i)
when delivered in person to the recipient named below, (ii) upon
receipt after deposit in the United States mail in a sealed envelope
or container, postage and postal charges prepaid, return receipt
requested or certified mail, addressed by name and address to the
party or person intended, or (iii) twenty-four (24) hours from
proper and timely delivery to on overnight courier service
addressed by name and address to the party or person intended as
follows:
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Notice to Grantor: [Grantor’s name and address]
Notice to Grantee: [Grantee’s name and address]
Either party may, by notice given at any time or from time to
time, require subsequent notices to be given to another individual
person, whether a party or an officer or representative, or to a
different address, or both. Notices given before actual receipt or
notice of change shall not be invalidated by the change
(14.) Severability. If any term or provision of this Agreement,
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall, to
any extent, be determined by judicial order or decision to be
invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement or the
application of such term or provision to persons or circumstances
other than those as to which it is held to be invalid, shall be
enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law.
(15.) Governing Law. Except as otherwise provided herein, this
Agreement be [sic] governed by the applicable laws of the State of
Texas, and the County where the Land is located shall be
considered the proper forum or jurisdiction for any disputes arising
in connection with this Agreement.
(16.) Successors and Assigns. The terms and provisions of this
Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of
the heirs, successors, assigns and personal representatives of the
Parties.
(17.) Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in
multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed the original,
and all of which together shall constitute a single instrument.
(18.) Easement Area Restoration. Within ninety (90) days after
installation of the 345 KV electric line has been completed and
electricity in commercial quantities is being transmitted, the
Grantee, without contribution from Grantor, will clean the
easement area, and as much as practical, restore the land to the
condition in which it was found before said installation, including
the removal of all rocks having a diameter of greater than twelve
inches (12”) which Grantee has unearthed.
(19.) Title Commitment Requirement. This Agreement is
executed in good faith by the Grantor as the holder of one hundred
percent (100%) of the ownership interests of the Land. Grantor and
Grantee agree that this Agreement is contingent upon (i) receipt by
Grantee of a title commitment from Stewart Title Guaranty
Company or other national title insurance company authorized to
do business in Texas and (ii) compliance with and completion of
all requirements of any such title company, as set forth on
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“Schedule C” of such title commitment, which act to clarify record
ownership of the Land and allow the title company to issue a title
policy based upon such title commitment. In the event the title
commitment and other supporting documents list vested ownership
interest in the Land in people or entities other than the people and
entities collectively named as “Grantor” in this Agreement and
signatories hereto, upon which Grantee has relied in entering into
this Agreement, this Agreement shall be null and void. Grantor and
Grantee also agree that the division of ownership percentages or
interests, if any, indicated in the title commitment shall be
determinative for the purposes of compensation paid by Grantee
under the separate Compensation agreement to this Agreement,
unless the Grantee is otherwise unanimously directed by all
applicable Grantor individuals and entities. Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary herein, in the event the ownership
percentages or interests as determined by a title commitment differ
from that stated in the separate Compensation agreement, but the
people or entities named as having an ownership interest in the title
commitment is the same as the people and entities collectively
named as “Grantor” herein, this Agreement shall be in full force
and effect and the Parties agree to enter into an amendment to the
separate Compensation agreement to this Agreement to reflect
proper payment allocation. In the event that there are parties or
entities listed in the title commitment as having an ownership
interest in the Land (including fee simple, remainder and life estate
interests) not a party to this Agreement, then this Agreement shall
be null and void, provided, however, ail entities and individuals
currently identified as a Grantor in this Agreement shall diligently
cooperate with Grantee to execute a similar new agreement with all
entities and individuals having an ownership interest in the Land
properly included. Grantor shall diligently cooperate with all
requirements that a title company may set forth (in a “Schedule C”
to a title commitment, or reasonably otherwise) in order to
determine, clarify and/or correct the record title to the Land.
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APPENDIX 5 - LCRA EASEMENT (TAKEN WITH EMINENT DOMAIN)
ELECTRIC LINE EASEMENT AND RIGHT-OF-WAY
EASEMENT PROPERTY: Two tracts of land consisting of
approximately 14.35 acres and 16.88 acres, both of which are in
Kimble County, Texas, being more particularly described on the
plat and field notes attached hereto as Exhibit A and Exhibit B,
which exhibits are incorporated herein for all purposes.
ACCESS EASEMENT: A tract of land consisting of
approximately 1.13 acres in Kimble County, Texas, being more
particularly described on the plat and field notes attached hereto as
Exhibit C, which exhibit is incorporated herein for all purposes.
PROJECT: Electric transmission line or lines not to exceed a
nominal voltage of 345 kV, consisting of a variable number and
sizes of wires and circuits, and all necessary or desirable
appurtenances (including insulators and above ground supporting
structures made of wood, metal, or other materials). The Project
may also include communication lines and appurtenances used
solely in connection with electric system operations.
GRANTOR, for the CONSIDERATION paid to GRANTOR,
hereby grants, sells, and conveys to GRANTEE an easement and
right-of-way in, over, across, under, upon, though, and above the
EASEMENT PROPERTY and in, over, across, and upon the
ACCESS EASEMENT, together with all and singular the rights and
appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, to have and hold it to
GRANTEE and GRANTEE’S successors and assigns forever. The
easement, right-of-way, rights, and privileges herein granted over the
EASEMENT PROPERTY shall be used for the purposes of locating,
constructing, placing, operating, maintaining, reconstructing,
replacing, rebuilding, upgrading, removing, inspecting, patrolling,
repairing, protecting, or altering the PROJECT, or any part of the
PROJECT, and making connections therewith.
GRANTEE shall have the right of ingress and egress at all
times upon and across the EASEMENT PROPERTY for the above
stated purposes and upon and across the ACCESS EASEMENT to
and from the EASEMENT PROPERTY to provide vehicular and
pedestrian access to and from the EASEMENT PROPERTY for
GRANTEE and its agents or contractors. GRANTEE shall have
the right to construct and maintain a right-of-way on the ACCESS
EASEMENT suitable for such access, but GRANTEE shall not be
responsible for the condition, repair, or maintenance of such rightof-way, except that GRANTEE shall repair any actual damage
done to such right-of-way by GRANTEE or any of its agents or
contractors or any actual damage done to any existing roads of
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GRANTOR located within the ACCESS EASEMENT. GRANTEE
shall have the right to install and maintain appropriate gates along and
in any fence, as necessary or appropriate for the exercise of
GRANTEE’S right of ingress and egress on the EASEMENT
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT.
GRANTEE shall have the right to place poles, towers, guys or
other ground-based support structures permanently on the
EASEMENT PROPERTY. GRANTEE shall have the right to place
new or additional wire or wires within the EASEMENT PROPERTY
and to change the sizes and transmission voltages thereof not to
exceed nominal 345 kV. GRANTEE shall have the right to locate,
relocate, or reconstruct the PROJECT within the EASEMENT
PROPERTY. GRANTEE shall have the right to trim, chemically
treat, and/or remove from the EASEMENT PROPERTY and
ACCESS EASEMENT all trees, shrubs, and parts thereof, and the
right to remove any structure, building, object, equipment, or
obstruction within the EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS
EASEMENT. GRANTEE shall limit chemical treatment of
vegetation to spot application to treat stumps resulting from removal
of trees and to keep undergrowth clear from gates, fences, and
transmission line support structures and appurtenances. GRANTEE
shall follow all applicable local, state, and federal laws, ordinances,
rules, and regulations in the application and use of chemicals on the
EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT.
GRANTOR shall not place or construct any structure in or on the
EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT. GRANTOR
may not plant any trees or shrubs on the EASEMENT PROPERTY
or ACCESS EASEMENT, nor retain or impound surface waters
within the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT, nor
change the grade of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS
EASEMENT without the prior written approval of GRANTEE.
GRANTOR shall not place or operate any temporary or permanent
equipment or object within the EASEMENT PROPERTY without
fully complying with all applicable laws and regulations. GRANTEE
shall have the right to place temporary poles, guys, and supporting
structures on the EASEMENT PROPERTY for use in erecting,
maintaining, or repairing the PROJECT.
GRANTOR reserves the right to use and enjoy the surface of the
EASEMENT PROPERTY for all purposes, including the right to
cultivate and grow crops; to cultivate gardens, grass, and landscaping;
to pasture livestock on the EASEMENT PROPERTY; to build fences
across; to temporarily park cars, trucks, and equipment on the
EASEMENT PROPERTY, and to place across the EASEMENT
PROPERTY, or on or along the length thereof, roads, streets,
driveways, and sidewalks, so long as such use or uses do not
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interfere with or interrupt the exercise of the easement rights
granted to GRANTEE herein.
GRANTEE agrees that upon completion of construction of the
PROJECT, GRANTEE shall remove and dispose of all debris, trash,
and litter resulting from construction on the EASEMENT
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT and shall restore the surface
of the EASEMENT PROPERTY, as nearly as reasonably practicable,
to the condition in which the EASEMENT PROPERTY was found
immediately before construction was begun; however, GRANTOR
understands and agrees that vegetation cleared from the EASEMENT
PROPERTY will not be replaced, and areas modified by GRANTEE
for access or erosion control will not be restored to their prior
condition.
It is understood and agreed that the CONSIDERATION herein
paid includes payment for all physical damages for the initial
construction and ordinary operation and maintenance of the
PROJECT, but does not include payment for physical damages, if
any, to GRANTOR’S remainder property, which may occur in the
future after the original construction of the PROJECT, directly
resulting from the reconstruction or repair of the PROJECT.
GRANTEE shall not be liable for damages caused by keeping the
EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT clear of trees,
undergrowth, brush, structures, and obstructions. All parts of the
PROJECT installed on the EASEMENT PROPERTY shall remain
the exclusive property of GRANTEE.
GRANTOR expressly reserves all oil, gas, and other minerals
owned by GRANTOR, in, on, and under the EASEMENT
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT, provided that GRANTOR
shall not be permitted to drill or excavate for minerals on the surface
of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT, but
GRANTOR may extract oil, gas, or other minerals from and under
the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT by
directional drilling or other means which do not interfere with or
disturb GRANTEE’S use of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or
ACCESS EASEMENT.
The rights granted to GRANTEE in this Easement and Right-ofWay are assignable in whole or in part. This instrument, and the terms
and conditions contained herein, shall inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon GRANTEE and GRANTOR, and their respective heirs,
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. GRANTOR
warrants and shall forever defend the Easement and Right-of-Way to
GRANTEE against anyone lawfully claiming or to claim the
EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT or any part
thereof, subject to the following:
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(i.) visible and apparent easements not appearing of record ;
(ii.) any discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or
boundary lines or any encroachments or any overlapping of
improvements which a current survey would show;
and,
(iii.) easements, restrictions, reservations, covenants, oil and
gas leases, mineral severances, and encumbrances for taxes and
assessments (other than liens and conveyances) presently of record
in the Official Public Records of Kimble County, but only to the
extent that said items are valid and in force at this time.
When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns
include the plural. When appropriate, the term “GRANTEE”
includes the employees and authorized agents of GRANTEE. This
instrument may be executed in duplicate originals, and each
counterpart shall be deemed an original and all such counterparts
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.

